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ARTICLES

Welfare Reform, Privatization, and
Power
RECONFIGURING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
STRUCTURES FROM THE GROUND UP
Wendy A. Bach'
INTRODUCTION

A few years ago, I was sitting across the table from a
group of lawyers representing the New York City welfare
department. We were discussing monitoring a settlement,
negotiated after six, hard-fought years of litigation. Like most
test-case litigation, the case consumed, over the years,
enormous advocacy resources from multiple financially
strapped and woefully understaffed legal services offices. The
case concerned the means by which the department provided
welfare-to-work services for welfare recipients who wanted to
go to school; the settlement contained extensive and detailed
requirements about how the interactions between our clients
and the city would proceed. As plaintiffs' counsel, we used the
lawsuit as a tool to enhance welfare recipients' access to
education. And more broadly, like the last decade of welfare
t Faculty, CUNY School of Law. I owe thanks to many colleagues, members
of the CUNY Faculty as well as to the school for its financial support of this project. I
am particularly grateful to Sameer Ashar, Rebecca Bratspies, Sue Bryant, Matthew
Diller, Stephen Loffredo, Andrea McCardle, Brooke Richie, Ruthann Robson, and the
participants in a Spring 2008 CUNY Faculty Forum for their invaluable feedback and
editing assistance. In addition, thanks go to Bao Chao Ruland, Dawn Philip, Stephanie
Sampalis, Sally Curan, Megan Stewart, Shalini Deo, and Anthony Cardoso as well as
the wonderful staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their research and editing
assistance. And finally, thanks to Carol O'Donnell for her consistent support.
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advocates' work, the litigation was part of our efforts to fight
against a web of mechanisms designed to force poor women off
of assistance in a continuing effort to "end welfare as we [knew]
it."1 The settlement was drafted as is typical in these cases: if a
class member with characteristics 1, 2 or 3 said X, the
department had to do Y unless A, B, or C was true and so on.
Every term had been carefully negotiated to increase
educational access and to afford procedural and substantive
rights to class members.
During this particular conversation, the parties turned
to the topic of how to monitor the specific terms of the
settlement when the terms were to be carried out by private
entities under contract to the city. When we questioned how we
could monitor the vendor's compliance with the settlement
provisions, the city's attorney looked across the table and said
without hesitation, "We can't monitor them. We don't know
what they are doing or how they are doing it. We just know
about outcomes like job placement." Although we worked our
cumbersome way through this problem for the purpose of that
litigation, in that moment I realized that there was an elephant
in the room. The contractors, who provided services to huge
swaths of the plaintiff class, were motivated by the terms of
their contract and the monthly contract monitoring sessions
conducted by the city and not by any of our carefully negotiated
words. At best, our effects were secondarily removed. So we
had a problem.
The more I thought about this problem, the more I
realized that it centered around a fundamental mismatch
between current modes of governance in public welfare
programs and the tools used by advocates in their efforts to
fight on behalf of their clients. The tools designed in response
to New Deal and post-New Deal governance structures were
becoming increasingly ineffective.
This Article addresses this mismatch between the law
and traditional advocacy methods in the context of the
privatization of the state's welfare functions.2 Beginning with
the recognition that privatization, in the form of contracting
1 Clinton's famous pledge was originally made during his 1992 presidential
campaign, R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 127 (2000), and
reiterated in his 1993 State of the Union Address. See 139 CONG. REC. H674, 676
(1993).
2 Although some academics have begun to raise this issue and some
organizations have begun to tackle this problem, our collective strategy on this issue
remains underdeveloped. See infra Parts II-III.
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welfare

administration, this Article asks a series of questions. For
example, from an administrative law perspective, how does
privatization, and specifically the contracting out of welfare
programs, affect the ability of poor communities to participate
in the formulation of welfare policy?' Similarly, how effective
are current administrative law tools in fostering accountability,
and to the extent that those tools are not effective at creating
points of intervention in policy making for poor communities,
what tools might be effective?
Part I, relying on a case study of welfare privatization in
New York City, illustrates how the dominance of contracting
out has radically changed the mode of governance in public
welfare programs, shifting it from law and regulation to
contracts and contract monitoring. Privatization in this
context, without any public input or initial scrutiny, has
resulted in a program that imposes highly punitive welfare
policies and fails to meet the needs of the poor for education
and jobs.
Part II examines whether either administrative law or
the market currently offers effective mechanisms for public
participation in this new form of administrative governance.
This Part concludes that neither the market itself nor
administrative accountability tools, as currently configured,
are effective at creating accountability for poor communities.
Part III explores new collaborative governance
structures. These structures provide a fruitful conceptual basis
for creating a politically feasible and effective governance
structure. However, the history of subordination and
disproportionate power that characterizes social welfare
history raises serious questions about the ability of poor
communities to participate effectively in these collaborative
endeavors. As a result, Part III argues that we must design
3 The efficacy and wisdom of turning to private entities to administer all or
part of welfare programs in specific, and the overwhelming role of privatization in
governance in general, is subject to substantial debate and raises tremendously
important questions. While I do not address these questions, the case study and other
examples in this Article support many of the concerns about this governmental
strategy that others articulate. For some important discussions of the threats of
privatization, see Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization and
ParticipatoryCitizenship, in PROGRESSivE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION AND MARKETS:
RETHINKING IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY 209, 210 (Clare Dalton ed., 2007); Martha
Minow, Public and PrivatePartnerships:Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 1229, 1246-54 (2003); Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization,6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 6 passim (1988).
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new
mechanisms
to
enable
substantive
community
participation. Finally, Part IV suggests that the creation of
robust, community-controlled monitoring bodies can address
the accountability 4 problems of governance by contract.
I.

CASE STUDY: WELFARE REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION IN

NEW YORK CITY

A.

The National Context: A Move Toward Privatization

The privatization of the United States public assistance
provision system through contracting has accelerated
dramatically in the last ten years. The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter
"PRA") eliminated Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(hereinafter "AFDC") and its guarantee of minimal subsistence,
and created Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(hereinafter "TANF") in its stead.6 Importantly, the PRA joined
a rising tide of initiatives to "reinvent government" by using
private sector tools and entities to free government from the
constraints of what was seen as excessive bureaucracy and
constrictive civil service rules.7 Throughout the country, state
4 In this Article, the term "accountability" refers to government and private
partners' accountability to the public in general, and poor communities in particular,
for the creation and implementation of welfare policy that can positively affect lives.
The myriad of individually-focused, non-accountability issues that arise in privatized
welfare services is not the Article's focus. For example, this Article focuses on
structures that would facilitate government transparency and participation by
community-based organizations in a policy setting rather than on how individual
welfare recipients might challenge the actions of a private entity providing services.
For discussions of these individual rights questions, see, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman,
Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 passim
(2001); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 231, 279-306 (1998).
5 The term "privatization" covers a broad range of mechanisms, including
the complete divestiture of assets by the government, deregulation, the use of vouchers
paid for by the government to buy particular commodities in the private market, and
contracting between the government and private entities, as well as other measures.
See Jack M. Beermann, Privatizationand PoliticalAccountability, 28 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1507, 1519 (2001) (citing Ronald Cass, Privatization:Politics,Law and Theory, 71
MARQ. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988)); see also JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY:
THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 6-7 (1996). This Article

addresses only privatization through contracting between administrative agencies and
private entities.
6 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2001).
7 See, e.g., M. BRYNA SANGER, THE WELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION
AND WELFARE REFORM 2 (2003) ("Most states and localities have been seizing the

opportunities provided by a loosening of federal mandates, responsibilities, and
authorities to restructure the arrangements for provision of services."); see also
Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
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and local jurisdictions have turned to the private sector to
respond to the challenges posed by the PRA. In the welfare-towork area, privatization has been a major tool in a very
effective campaign to significantly reduce the welfare rolls.
Today, the full range of services, from eligibility
determinations to welfare-to-work services, are being
conducted not directly by government entities but by private,
often large, for-profit corporate entities.8 Although contracting
had always played some role in the provision of welfare-to-work
services, the entrance of large, for-profit corporations, the scale
of contracting out in some jurisdictions, and the focus on
performance-based contracting, has significantly altered this
landscape.
The move to privatization arose in large part from two
significant shifts in federal law. In 1996, the federal
government invited states to use private entities to provide
services and to use virtually any means at their disposal to
lower the welfare rolls. 9 These changes created an ideal
environment for a large growth in the role of private entities.
The PRA included a provision allowing states and localities to
contract out eligibility determinations, 10 creating a new and
potentially tremendously lucrative market for the for-profit
EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1123-29 (2000) (describing the
prominent role of the private sector and private sector management techniques in the
administration of welfare programs after 1996 and arguing that these changes are
decreasing opportunities to hold government accountable).
8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-245, WELFARE REFORM: INTERIM
REPORT ON POTENTIAL WAYS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF STATE AND
LOCAL CONTRACTING 3 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02245.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, WELFARE REFORM]. In 2005, forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia did some contracting of welfare-to-work services at the state or local level.
SONDRA YOUDELMAN WITH PAUL GETSOS, COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, THE REVOLVING
DOOR: RESEARCH FINDINGS ON NYC'S EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AND PLACEMENT SYSTEM
AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN MOVING PEOPLE FROM WELFARE TO WORK 21 (2005),
available at http://www.cvhaction.org/reports (follow link to The Revolving Door-Full
Report.pdf) [hereinafter THE REVOLVING DOOR].
9 42 U.S.C § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2001).
1O Id. § 604a(a)(1) ("A State may ... administer and provide services under
the [TANF] program[] ... through contracts with charitable, religious, or private
organizations; and ... provide beneficiaries of assistance under the [TANF] program]
... with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement which are redeemable
with such organizations."). As a practical matter, the PRA's allowance of the
contracting out of eligibility determinations was limited, to a certain extent, by the
federal government's refusal to allow the contracting out of eligibility determinations
for food stamps and Medicaid. For example, in 1997 the Clinton administration denied
a request from Texas to contract out its TANF program on the grounds 'that it would
empower private sector employees to determine eligibility for Medicaid and Food
Stamps." Kennedy, supra note 4, at 231 (citing White House Limits States in
PrivatizingWelfare, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997, at A20).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

sector. 1 Second, and equally significantly, the statute moved
power for setting welfare policy from the federal government to
states and localities, a trend generally referred to as
"devolution."12 The PRA envisioned widespread state and local
experimentation and, in many ways, paralleled the incentivebased contracts that would emerge in the welfare-to-work
arena. States were given a fixed sum of money (the sum they
received under the AFDC program in 1995), few mandates, and
enormous motivation to lower their welfare caseloads by any
means they saw fit.13 The message from the federal government
to the states was crystal clear: if you manage to cut the welfare
rolls, you will be rewarded financially, and, to a far greater
degree than under the AFDC program, we will not hold you
accountable for the means by which you achieved this goal.14
11 See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State
Welfare Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1; Dru Stevenson, Privatization of
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 83, 89 (2003).
For a more extensive discussion of the role of privatization in the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRA") and in particular the
move to inclusion of for-profit entities in the provision of welfare programs, see
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 256-67.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2001); see also infra notes 13 & 15.
13 The welfare law was touted as promoting devolution and, to a certain
extent, it did leave states room to experiment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (describing
the purpose of the legislation as "to increase the flexibility of States"). However, state
flexibility was limited by a series of significant constraints on the ability of the states
to provide assistance. For example, states were barred from providing TANF-funded
benefits to many lawful immigrants, were not permitted to provide federally funded
benefits for more than five years, and were constrained in a variety of ways from
providing these benefits to teenage parents and to parents who failed to comply with
work and child support requirements. Id. §§ 608-609 (Supp. III 1997).
Principle among the changes embodied in federal welfare reform was the
concept of "devolution-a devolving of authority for programmatic design from the
federal government to the states. This principle is embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 601, which
describes the purpose of the program as "increas[ing] the flexibility of States in
operating a program designed to" meet the purposes of the statute and which
eliminates any individual entitlement to receive benefits under the program. Id. § 601
(Supp. III 1997).
14 Although there is no question that the PRA called for devolution of power
on a much larger scale than earlier welfare programs, Joel Handler argued
persuasively that throughout the twentieth century the United States has consistently
delegated administration of social welfare programs to lower levels of government
when the subjects of the program are socially categorized as "undeserving." HANDLER,
supra note 5, at 49.

When there is agreement on the deservingness of the category, the program
is federally administered and fairly routine. On the other hand, when welfare
is controversial, and when controversies boil up and demand upper-level
attention ... the preferred response, from the perspective of the legislature,
is to try to escape political costs by granting symbolic victories and delegating
the controversy back down to the local level.
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These twin invitations, to use private entities to provide
services and to use virtually any means at their disposal to
lower the rolls, created an ideal environment for a large growth
5
in the role of private entities.1
And grow it did. The most recent national survey,
released in 2002 by the United States General Accounting
Office, reported that in 2001, forty-nine states and the District
of Columbia used contracts with private entities to provide
some welfare services. 6 Nationwide spending in 2001 exceeded
$1.5 billion, which represented at least 13% of total federal
TANF and state maintenance-of-effort expenditures, excluding
expenditures for cash assistance. 17 And not only did the general
use of private entities grow, but the use of for-profit entities
grew exponentially. By 2001, 13% of the $1.5 billion given to
private entities to operate TANF and TANF-related programs
went to for-profit entities. 8
B.

New York City: Welfare Reform and the Move Toward
Privatization

Welfare reform of the kind
in earnest in New York City prior
In 1995, then-Mayor Rudolph
Resources Commissioner Jason

envisioned by the PRA began
to passage of the federal law.
Giuliani and then-Human
Turner created the work

15 For a discussion of the interlinking roles of privatization, devolution and
reinvention of government in an array of social service contexts, see Jody Freeman, The
ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155, 160-64 (2000).
16 See GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8.
17 Id. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or TANF, is the name of the

federal program created by the PRA. Under the terms of the PRA, in order to draw
down federal TANF funds, states were required to spend on TANF or TANF-like
programs 75% (or in some circumstances 80%) as much as they contributed toward
federal welfare assistance-the Aid to Dependent Children program-in 1994. 45
C.F.R. § 263.1 (2006). This is referred to as the "Maintenance of Effort" ("MOE")
requirements. Id. § 263.30. Thus, the GAO's use of the combined TANF and MOE
dollars to calculate the scale of privatization accurately reflects the minimum amount
states were spending on privatized welfare services in 2001. In addition, because some
states actually regularly spend more on TANF and TANF-related goals than they need
to in order to meet the federal MOE requirement, the GAO estimate is probably low.
See, e.g., E-mail from Trudi Renwick, Senior Economist, Fiscal Policy Institute, to
Wendy A. Bach, Instructor, City University of New York School of Law (Nov. 16, 2007,
10:02 AM EST) (on file with author) (citing data provided to Ms. Renwick from the New
York State Division of the Budget showing that New York State MOE spending
exceeded required MOE spending in federal fiscal years from 2001-2006 in sums
ranging from $51 million to $703 million per year).
18 GAO, WELFARE REFORM, supra note 8, at 8. An in-depth discussion of the
significance of the entrance of the for-profit sector in welfare services is outside the
scope of this Article. For an interesting discussion of this topic, see SANGER, supra note

7, at 72-97.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

experience program ("WEP") and predicated eligibility for
public assistance on participation in WEP for thirty-five hours
per week. 9 Along with WEP, Giuliani and Turner changed the
"culture" of welfare offices by establishing Eligibility
Verification Review, a system that mandated that recipients
repeatedly verify factors related to eligibility, and by
converting Income Support Centers to Job Centers. 0 Welfare
reform was designed to create "a crisis in welfare recipients'
lives, precipitating such dire prospects as hunger and
homelessness."21
The move to privatization in New York City came a few
years later. In 1999, the Giuliani administration put out for bid
$500 million in contracts to provide welfare-to-work services for
public assistance recipients.2 2 Privatization of welfare-to-work
services proceeded and expanded over the next several years
with contracts to provide employment assessments, services for
individuals who alleged physical and mental impairments that
interfered with their ability to work, and a variety of other
services. 23 The contracts were generally performance-based,
paying contractors only when they met performance goals for a
particular client.24

19

COMM. ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, NEW YORK CITY BAR, WELFARE REFORM

IN NEW YORK CITY: THE MEASURE
http://www.abcny.org/Publications/

OF

SUCCESS

§

I.C

(Aug.

2001),

reports/show html.php?rid=41 [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY].

20 Id. § II.A.1.
21 Id. (citing Commissioner Jason Turner, Address at the Nelson A.
Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't (Nov. 1998)).
22 See id.
23 See generally, e.g., THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8 (discussing
contracting out of assessment and welfare-to-work services); ALEXA KASDAN WITH
SONDRA YOUDELMAN, COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, FAILURE TO COMPLY: THE
DISCONNECT BETWEEN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IN HRA'S WECARE PROGRAM
(2007)
[hereinafter
FAILURE
TO
COMPLY],
available
at

http://cvh.mayfirst.org/files/WeCareReportFinal.pdf (discussing the privatization of
HRA's disability assessment process). This growth in welfare contracting was part of
an overall expansion of human services contracting during this period in New York
City.

See,

e.g.,

SUSAN

BUTTENWIESER,

CITY

PROJECT

BULLETIN,

FOCUS

ON

CONTRACTING (Dec. 2000) http'//www.cityproject.org/plublications/contracting/2000-1231.html (stating that in 2000 human services contracting was over $4.2 billion or 11%
of New York City's budget).
24 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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1. The Advocacy Community Responds to Welfare

Reform
Central among the advocacy community's strategies to
combat welfare reform were the filing of class action law suits
to stop or slow the implementation of key welfare reform
initiatives and a series of lobbying and organizing efforts to
blunt the harshest effects of reform."5 The litigation
successfully slowed implementation of welfare reform, ensuring
some adherence to both due process and substantive rights in
the implementation of reform.26 Similarly, lobbying efforts
resulted in the preservation of some protections that had been
assured under AFDC. 27 Nevertheless, welfare reform, evaluated
solely on the basis of whether welfare rolls plummeted, was
significantly more successful. Between 1995 and 2006, the
welfare rolls in New York City plummeted an astounding sixtyfive percent. 28 If parallel economic improvements by former
welfare recipients accompanied those roll reductions, advocates
could have concurred with the administration that welfare
reform was a success. But, as was the case nationwide, this did
not occur.2 9 The social safety net was largely dismantled and
25

See WELFARE REFORM

IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19,

§ II (describing a

series of problems with the welfare system and the litigation that responded to that

problems); see also infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing organizing
efforts around welfare). Among the litigation efforts was Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), which challenged the conversion of welfare centers from
Income Support Centers to "Job Centers" on the ground that the agency was
'preventing people from applying for Medicaid, food stamps, cash assistance, and
emergency assistance in violation of federal and state statutory and constitutional
law." WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, § II.A.1. For an in-depth
look at the litigation efforts of the advocacy community from 1996 forward, see Nat'l
Developments
(1996-2004),
Case
Law
and
Econ. Justice,
Ctr. for
http'//www.nclej.orgcourts-case-dev.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
26

WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supranote 19.

See, e.g., Stephen Lof-redo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes
From a Law School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 193-96 (2001) (discussing the
lobbying campaign spear headed by the Welfare Rights Initiative, a community based
organizing group, and supported by a CUNY Law School clinic to expand access to
education and training through amendments to state legislation and characterizing
those changes as reclaiming ground lost as a result of welfare reform).
28 Sewell Chan, Welfare Rolls Falling Again, Amid Worries About Poverty,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at B1. As of April 16, 2007, New York City's welfare dropped
to a historic low of 368,444, a total decline of nearly 68% since 1995. Press Release,
Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, New York State Welfare Rolls Continue
to Decline (April 16, 2007), httpJ/www.dads.ny.gov/main/news/2007/2007-04-16.asp.
29 WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19 (discussing the rise in
hunger and homelessness that occurred in New York City); see also Juliet M. Brodie,
Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law Agenda, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 201, 216 (2006) (discussing the often worsening economic
27
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families remained steeped in deep poverty and ever more
vulnerable to the vagaries of the low-wage labor market. 0
In addition, paralleling a nationwide trend, New York
City saw the founding and growth of a number of grassroots
organizing groups that took on various welfare reform issues.
Chief among these were Families United for Racial and
Economic Equality, founded in 2000 by a group of women on
welfare to improve welfare recipients' access to education,31 the
Welfare Rights Initiative, founded in 1997 by a group of women
on welfare attending the City University of New York who
work to "inject the voices of students (especially those with
firsthand experience of poverty) into [welfare reform
debates],"32 and Community Voices Heard ("CVH"), "an
organization of low-income people, predominantly women ...
on welfare, working to build power in New York City ...to
improve the lives of our families and communities." 33 These
groups employed a variety of organizing and advocacy
strategies to bring attention to and combat welfare reform.
These organizing tactics were, in many cases, quite effective in
bringing pressure to bear on the local administration around
some of the worst aspects of welfare reform and in adding to
34
national efforts to combat welfare reform.
circumstances of former welfare recipients in the workforce due to increased expenses
associated with work).

30 See, e.g., WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19, § II.A.1

(discussing the rise in hunger and homelessness that occurred in New York City).
31 See Families United for Racial and Economic Equality, Who We Are,
http://www.furee.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
32 See Welfare Rights Initiative, Mission Statement, http//www.wri-ny.org
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008); see also Loffredo, supra note 27, at 190-91.
33 Community Voices Heard, Mission Statement, http://www.cvhaction.org
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008). CVH aims to accomplish its goals "through a multipronged strategy, including public education, grass roots organizing, [and] leadership
development ." Id.
34 Some of the most visible New York City organizing work from this time

was documented in A Day's Work, A Day's Pay, a documentary produced by Mint Leaf
Productions:
[The documentary] follows three welfare recipients in New York City from
1997 to 2000 as they participate in the largest welfare-to-work program in
the nation. When forced to work at city jobs for well below the prevailing
wage and deprived of the chance to go to school, these individuals decide to
fight back, demanding programs that will actually help them move off of
welfare and into jobs. It was broadcast nationwide on PBS and cable
throughout 2002 and 2003.
Mint
Leaf
Productions,
A
Day's
Work,
A
Day's
Pay,
httpJ/www.mintleafproductions.com/adw.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008). Another
highly visible and effective national campaign, Welfare Made a Difference, was
launched by the Community Food Resource Network. Caitlin Johnson, When Welfare
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2. The Advocacy Community Responds to Privatization
Directly
While the traditional litigation and lobbying advocacy
efforts affected privatization only indirectly, other advocacy
efforts aimed directly at privatization itself. Chief among early
efforts to combat privatization was a campaign to target35ethical
breaches in the city's first wide-scale contracting efforts.
In 1999, the Giuliani administration sought to let $500
million in private entities contracts to provide welfare-to-work
administration's
the
immediately,
Almost
services. s
contractual bidding process embroiled the administration in a
scandal. The City Comptroller Alan Hevesi investigated
allegations that the administration violated fair bidding rules
by engaging in "wide-ranging discussions ...on its ' welfare
reform efforts'" with officials at Maximus Inc., the eventual
recipients of the largest share of the contracts, five months
prior to its first informational meeting with other prospective
bidders.3 7 The comptroller engaged in a protracted but
ultimately unsuccessful effort to stop the letting of the
Maximus contract.
In addition, in 2004 and 2005, CVH began to research
the effectiveness of welfare-to-work contracts. 9 The report the
group issued is one of the few pieces of qualitative research
documenting the problematic experience of welfare recipients
in privatized service environments. 40 The report provides
essential data on how privatization harms poor communities,
augments and legitimates an organizing campaign to improve
Works, CONNECT FOR KIDS, http://www.connectforkids.org/node/222 (last visited Sept.
27, 2008). "The mission of the ... campaign [was] to document the experiences of
parents who have received welfare and collect their recommendations for improving
the system." Id.
35 See, e.g., Privatization in Practice:Human Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1435, 1446-51 (comments of Liz Krueger, former Associate Director of Community Food
Resource Center, describing her criticisms of various early contracting efforts by New
York City).
36 WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19.
37 Nina Bernstein, Company Had Head Start PreparingBid in Welfare-toWork Program,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at B6.
38 See WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY, supra note 19.
39 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8,at 17.
40 But see Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity, and Welfare
Privatization,13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 391 (2006). Relying on extensive focus
group interviews with welfare recipients and other actors in the social welfare system
in Buffalo, New York, Professor Munger provides a fascinating account of the effects of
privatization and other aspects of welfare reform on the self-perception of women
receiving welfare. Id. at 392.
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welfare policy, and offers an effective model of advocacy to
address the harms of privatization. As described more fully in
Part IV, CVH's work and methodology can be incorporated into
public law mechanisms to create accountability in the
contracting process.
3. Privatization Outcomes: A Program That Failed to
Move People from Welfare to Work
CVH's report documented the extraordinary overall
failure of New York City's first large-scale privatization effort.
In the report, entitled The Revolving Door: Research Findings
on NYC's Employment Services and Placement System and Its
Effectiveness in Moving People from Welfare to Work ("The
Revolving Door"), CVH studied the effectiveness of contracts
between the City of New York and private vendors to provide
welfare-to-work services.41 The researchers took New York City
at its word that the main goal of the program was to move
people from welfare to work and "set out to uncover whether or
not currently operating job readiness and job placement
programs accomplish their intended goals, what stands in their
way, and how they might be improved to better serve the needs
of the clients, the providers, and the system at large."42 With
very few exceptions, CVH revealed a system that was almost
completely failing to meet its stated goals.
The contracts were entirely performance-based,
meaning that vendors were paid only when a client reached a
particular outcome. 48 At the start of the contracts, the city
41

THE REVOLVING DOOR, supranote 8, at 2. The program under study in THE

REVOLVING DOOR was New York City's Employment Services and Placement (ESP)
program. Id. This program was designed to serve approximately 27,000 clients per year
from the city at a cost of approximately $43,000,000 per year. Id. at 28. Individuals
participated for 35 hours per week for a maximum of six months. Id. at 29. For the first
two weeks of the program, they spent all their time with the private vendor, engaging
in assessment, job readiness, and job search activities. Id. After two weeks they spent
two full days a week at the vendor's site and three days a week working in a work
experience placement at another site. Id. The goal of the program, according to city
documents, was to "assist all non-exempt" applicants and participants to achieve selfreliance through paid employment. Id. at 27.
42 Id. at 13. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, CVH
analyzed documents from the city agency obtained through Freedom of Information Act
requests, performed a random survey of 600 clients, interviewed staff from all but one
of the vendors, and conducted twelve in-depth client interviews. Id. at 17-18.
43 Id. at 27. The total reliance on performance-based incentives in these
contracts made them unusual. "In 2001, only 20 percent of all [TANF] contracts were
incentive-based in any way." Id. (citing SANGER, supra note 7, at 20). The privatized
vendors were representative of the wide range of private entities in the field. Included
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projected that, of the individuals who enrolled in the program,
46% would be placed, 35% would retain jobs for three months,
and 25% would retain them for six months. 44 The actual
outcomes, however, were far less impressive. Of the average of
4144 people who were referred into the system each month,
only 8%, or 346, were placed in employment, and of those, 43%
(149 individuals) still had their jobs at three months, and 35%
(121 individuals) had their jobs after six months. 4 The program
referred clients to jobs that offered low salaries, little stability
and very little chance of leading the families out of poverty.
Seventy-five percent of those with Employment Services and
Placement ("ESP") vendor-referred jobs earned $8.00 per hour
or less, 19% were referred to part-time positions, and many of
the full-time positions were temporary. 41 Moreover, of those
placed in jobs who earned enough to close their welfare cases,
29% returned to public assistance within six months and 36%
remained unaccounted for.47
Given the low placement and retention figures, CVH
focused significant portions of the report on documenting what
happened to the 92% of the population who were not placed
were large, multi-national, and national corporations such as Affiliated Computer
Services, Inc. and America Works, fairly large non-profits such as Federation
Employment Guidance Service, Inc., Goodwill Industries, and Wildcat Service
Corporation, and New York City based non-profit entities such as the Non-Profit
Assistance Corporation. See id. at 28, 33. The organizations used a wide variety of
programs and tactics to provide services but were all operating under the same
incentive-based contract terms. Vendors received 25% percent of the maximum per
client payment at job placement, 45% if the person retained the job after three months,
and the remainder if the person retained the job for six months. Id. at 27. The vendor
could also receive some bonus payments for placement in "high wage" jobs or jobs that
led to a closure of the welfare case. Id.
44

Id. at 28.

Id. at 32. Interestingly, after the report was released, the major dispute
between CVH and the city agency had to do with how placement and retention figures
should be calculated. CVH insisted that the system as a whole be held accountable not
only for those who enroll but for those who are referred. Email from Sondra
Youdelman, CVH, to Wendy A. Bach, CUNY Law School (Nov. 8, 2008, 12:12:17 PM
EST) (on file with author). Thus CVH's calculation leaves all referred individuals in the
denominator, thus reducing the percentages of "success." CVH's position was, rightly,
that, given that the city advertised the program as one designed to assist clients, if
clients choose not to participate in a program, that too is a sign of failure on the
program's part. However, even if one accepts the city's position and calculates the
numbers counting only those who enrolled in the program, the statistics do not improve
significantly: only an average of 15% of those who enroll are placed in jobs by the end of
six months in contrast to the 25% projected by the city. In addition, this calculation
dispute does not affect CVH's findings as to the nature of the jobs held by those who
45

actually obtained employment. THE REVOLVING DOOR, supranote 8, at 33, 35-36.
46

47

Id. at 35.
Id. at 39.
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and the structures that led to these breakdowns .48 The program
punished, through a reduction of already meager benefits, 49 a

disturbingly high number of individuals for some failure to
comply with rules.50 Of all those referred each month, 76% of
the population (on average 3149 people) fell into this category,
either because they did not attend the program at the start
(30% of the full population) or because the agency concluded
that they had failed to comply with some program rule later in
the process (46% of the full population). 51 This dramatic

contrast between the 121 people in jobs after six months and
the over 3000 people punished monthly in the system

52
represented, in CVH's estimation, an utterly failed system.

Despite these clear failures, when the city redesigned and rebid
the contracts in 2006, the contract incentives were modified
only slightly,5 3 and the same vendors that had run the ESP
5 4
program received new contracts.
48
49

THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 77-92.
Under New York State Law, when an individual fails or refuses without
good cause to comply with work program requirements, their pro rata share of the
budget is reduced for some period of time. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 342 (McKinney
1997). The length of sanction varies based on the number of previous sanctions in the
household's record and the composition of the family. Id. § 342.2-.3 For example, for the
mother of two children who "fails to comply" a second time, her regular grant of $691 is
reduced by one-third for a minimum of three months. N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit.
18, § 385.12(d) (2008). At any one time an average of approximately 25% of the overall
caseload is either in the pipeline to be sanctioned or is actually sanctioned. For the
current work participation status of the New York City caseload, see HUMAN RES.
ADMIN., CITY OF N.Y., DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., WEEKLY CASELOAD ENGAGEMENT STATUS

(2008), http'J/www.nyc.gov/html/hra/downloads/pdf/citywide.pdf. This document regularly provides data on the proportion of the caseload in various statuses including those
in the sanction process or with a sanction in effect. The statistics posted from the week
of October 12, 2008 listed 24.2% of cases as in the sanction process (10.3%) or with a
sanction in effect (13.9%). Id.
50 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 77.
51 See id. The complete outcome data was as follows: 8% placed; 30%
sanctioned for failure to appear; 14% sent back to the agency because of an
inappropriate referral; 46% sanctioned for failure to comply with a program rule; and
2% still active in the program. Id. at 78.
52 Id. at 32, 93.
53 The payment milestones under the Back to Work Program were as follows:
contractors could be paid a maximum of $5,000 per participant; 10% is paid upon
completion of an assessment and employment plan (a new aspect of the contracts); 30%
is paid upon placement in unsubsidized employment for thirty days at a minimum of
twenty hours per week; 10% is paid if the placement is of a "time limited" or for a
sanctioned individual; 2% is paid if the placement results in a case closure; 25% is paid
for retention at 180 days; and an additional 3% is paid if the individual shows a 10%
wage gain from initial placement. The contracts also provide additional incentive
payments for vendors that increase the rate of sanction case removal, increase positive
administrative indicators, and increase the federal work participation rate. See
Contract Between the City of New York and America Works of New York, May 2, 2006
(on file with author); see also ALEXA KASDEN WITH SONDRA YOUDELMAN, MISSING THE
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These two pieces of data, first that the overwhelming
majority of recipients ended up sanctioned instead of employed,
and second that, despite this failure, the contracts were re-let
to the same vendors on similar terms, suggest something quite
disturbing. As noted above, welfare reform has been deemed a
success in large part because of the radical reductions in
caseload. However, those reductions have not been
accompanied by a similar advancement of welfare recipients in
the labor market. The ESP program, although promoted as one
designed to move people into the labor force, appears
significantly more successful at punishment than at placement.
Given the agency's apparent endorsement of these outcomes
through the re-letting of contracts to the same vendors, it is
fair to speculate that these devastating outcomes were
endorsed by the agency letting the contract. 55 For the purposes
of this Article, the question becomes how these outcomes were
effectuated.

MARK: AN EXAMINATION OF NYC'S BACK TO WORK PROGRAM AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN
MEETING EMPLOYMENT GOALS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS 79 (2008) [hereinafter

MISSING THE MARK], availableat httpJ/cvh.mayfirst.org/flles/Missingi20the%20
Mark%20-%2OFinal%20Report.pdf.
54

See COMMUNITY VOICES HEARD, HRA BACK TO WORK SUPPORT AND
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE/TRAINING,
AND
EVALUATION
(2007),

ACCOUNTABILITY
INITIATIVE:
MONITORING/ASsESSMENT,

http://www.cvhaction.org/node/160#attachments.
55 In addition, although the specific reasons for the re-letting of the contracts
were not clear, it is likely that the agency was subject, to a certain degree, to capture
by the agencies that held the ESP contracts. This means that even if real competition
existed at the beginning of the ESP program, by the time the new requests for
proposals were issued, there were very few other vendors who were able to credibly bid
for the contracts. This phenomena and its possible impact provide support for
arguments that privatization through contracting is problematic because it strips the
government of the ability to control programs over time. See infra note 100. That the
ESP program was designed more as a caseload reduction mechanism than as a real
means to helping recipients find work is confirmed by the statement of Nancy
Biberman, the Executive Director of WHEDCO, a New York City non-profit that
received an ESP contract:
The ESP program and contracts were never intended to result in viable jobs
for welfare recipients. The rapid reduction of the welfare caseload was the
public policy mandate out of which the ESP program was created.... The
contracts were structured to provide financial incentives for "rapid labor
market attachment" (the expressly stated goal of HRA commissioner Jason
Turner). Consequently at best they provided quick job placements and
woefully unsatisfactory job retention outcomes.
SANGER, supra note 7, at 56.
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4. Privatization Incentives: The Motivating Forces
Behind Failure
CVH's report not only documented the failures of the
ESP system but identified the systemic problems that led to
these outcomes. Its criticisms were wide-ranging. CVH noted
problems that predicted failure, including the lack of
experienced job developers and inadequate curriculum for job
skills training.56 For the purposes of this Article, however, the
most interesting critiques focused on how both the formal
contract terms, and the formal and informal contract
performance
monitoring, failed to create meaningful
employment.," In particular, the report criticized the lack of
access to education and training and the contractual
disincentives to providing services to clients whose path to
work would be challenging.58
Despite a legal entitlement to having one's preference
59
for education or training honored under many circumstances
and a desire, by 71% of the clients, to attend education or
training,6 CVH found that one in three clients "did not know
that education and training might satisfy a portion of their
work requirements" 61 and only 18% of ESP participants
attended such programs.62 CVH reported that the structure of
the contract payment system led to a failure to provide
education and training.63 Quite simply, the contracts created no
real incentive to place people in education and training as
vendors, paid only for placement and retention, focused their
efforts on placement as the most likely strategy to improve
their rates.- These performance incentives led the vendors to

56 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supranote 8, at 4-5, 45.
57 Id. at 69-71.
58

Id.

59 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 335 (McKinney 1997).
60 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supranote 8, at 64.
61 Id. at 53
62

Id.

63
64

Id. at 69-71.
Id. at 70. Although the contractual focus on retention would seem to push

vendors to give participants access to education and training to promote hiring into
more stable employment, this apparently did not occur. Instead, given the difficulty in
meeting the retention goals, vendors reported to CVH that they focused efforts on
upping their numbers of initial placements as a way to ensure a steady cash flow. See
id.
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"cream," selecting out and serving those who were easier to
65
serve, and avoiding serving those with greater needs:
Many providers felt frustrated that the fully performance-based
structure of the contracts, defining performance solely in reference to
the final outcome of job placement and not the steps necessary to
reach that outcome, put them in a bind. They did, at times, need to
focus on the individuals that were most likely to be placed quickly,
and overlook those that needed more support to reach that stage.
Such a financial assessment forced vendors from time to time to
compromise their ethics .... Vendors that would normally want to

prioritize education and training for clients ... are forced to merely
focus on job placement for cash flow purposes.66

Equally disturbing were the incentives created by the contract
to divert those who were harder to serve by finding a means to
punish them for non-compliance instead of serving them. CVH
reported that the vendors were "discouraged from working with
clients for the long amount of time often necessary to address
67
barriers and are instead encouraged to sanction them."
Furthermore, "[t]he incentives are structured in a way that
encourages vendors to work with those easiest to place quickly,
and leave behind those that need more support and more time
for initial placement. Clients realize this and grow wary of a
68
system that is failing to meet their needs."
Not only did the performance incentives, on their face,
discourage vendors from working with those clients requiring
65 Although the CVH study is one of the few to document the creaming
phenomenon, it has long been the fear of critics who oppose using performance-based
contracts in the welfare area. See, e.g., LaDonna Pavetti et al., Changing the Culture of
the Welfare Office: The Role of Intermediaries in Linking TANF Recipients with Jobs,

FED. REs. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Sept. 2001, at 63, 68. For an extensive

discussion of these and other phenomena in the contracting out of welfare services, see
SANGER, supra note 7, at 16-21. In addition to the clear contract incentives to serve
only those easiest to serve, there are greater institutional pressures on employment
agencies to avoid serving those who are hardest to serve. As Joel Handler has aptly
observed:
State employment services compete with private services in presenting
themselves as reliable sources of qualified labor to private employers. Sadly,
it is not in their interests to devote a great deal of resources to those welfare
recipients who could benefit the most from work experience and training....
The strategy will be to satisfy the minimum funding requirements and
somehow deflect the hard cases. Difficult clients (that is, clients with lots of
problems) will somehow be excused or dropped from programs instead of
receiving extra help and encouragement.
HANDLER, supranote 5, at 28.
66 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 70.
67 Id. at 8.
68

Id.
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additional services, but vendors reported that, in the informal
monitoring processes, they were regularly encouraged by the
city agency to sanction clients. In the words of one vendor
addressing the failures of the ESP system:
Why continue to send people to the same program if it's not working?
...HRA tells us to [sanction them for failing to comply], but why?
They are just sent to another ESP Site. We're known for keeping
people on our roster for too long. But, if we [sanction] everyone, we
69
wouldn't have anyone. The whole system is a recycling process.

At this point several things should be clear. First, from
an outcome perspective, privatization failed to move people
from welfare to work, and the vast majority of clients ended up
punished instead of helped. Second, the city's renewal of
contracts with the same vendors and with only minor
modifications of the contract terms appeared to endorse these
outcomes. 70 Third, from an administrative law perspective, the
motivating force governing the interaction between the welfare
recipient and the "welfare worker" had radically shifted. In a
traditional administrative law setting, the behavior of the
government-employed welfare worker is motivated, at least in
theory, by the mandates contained in law, regulation, and subregulatory materials.
CVH's report provides support for the hypothesis that
the vendor's behavior is governed in large part by contract
terms and not primarily by the substantive statute or
regulation governing the welfare program. Even beyond this,
performance under the contract is motivated not only by those
formal contract incentives but by informal monitoring
mechanisms. When the city agency pushed vendors to sanction
clients rather than give them services, this dynamic became
clear.
Id. at 7 (quoting an ESP provider).
In many ways the data CVH uncovered was not surprising when viewed in
a national context. Researchers have long observed that performance-based contracts
in the welfare arena would create incentives to reduce services and push recipients off
of the welfare rolls. For example, in probably the most celebrated use of private
contractors in welfare reform, contractors in the W-2 program in Wisconsin were
permitted to keep a portion of unspent contract funds, and, in certain circumstances, to
keep benefits that they withheld from recipients as a result of case sanctions, thus
creating enormous incentives to withhold benefits and services. Karyn Rotker, Jane
Ahlstrom & Fran Bernstein, Wisconsin Works-For Private Contractors,That Is, 35 J.
POvERTY L. & POLY 530, 533 (2002). For a more in depth discussion of the way that
corporations are given incentives to maximize profits through denying or reducing
benefits and services, see Kennedy, supra note 4, at 301-02.
69
70
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Although CVH was able, through fairly extraordinary
efforts,1 to uncover this data and write a detailed and critical
report, the contract terms and contract monitoring structures
that led to these outcomes were created with little or no public
72
scrutiny.
Privatization, at least in this context, was thus an
extraordinarily effective mechanism to design and implement,
without any public input or initial scrutiny, a program that
would impose highly punitive welfare policies. This lack of
public input is precisely the problem that this Article seeks to
address. The central question, then, is whether either
administrative law or the market currently offers an effective
mechanism for public participation in this new form of
administrative governance or whether new administrative law
structures must be designed to respond more effectively to this
lack of transparency and accountability. Part II turns to the
first of these questions.
II.

THE FEASIBILITY OF RELYING ON TRADITIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURES OR THE MARKET
TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF PRIVATIZATION

Traditional administrative law offers a variety of tools
designed to ensure that when the government formulates
policies, it is accountable to the public and adheres to
fundamental democratic norms. 73 Chief among these structures
are freedom of information and sunshine laws, laws requiring
that the government provide notice of administrative
rulemaking and an opportunity for the public to comment prior
to final promulgation of rules, and mechanisms for members of
the public to sue if an administrative agency acts outside the
4
boundaries of its statutory mandate.7
71 CV-H relied both on its own capacity to collect data and, to some extent, on
the initial naivetk of the administration. When CVH sought to reproduce its
methodology in a subsequent report, it encountered substantially more resistance and
ultimately did not prevail in getting anywhere near the robust data that it did for the
ESP report. FAILURE TO COMPLY, supranote 23, at 10.
72 The contracts were let through traditional public contracting procedures, a
process that leaves virtually no room for public input into the substantive terms of the
contract. See infra Part II.

73 See generally RICHARD

J. PIERCE ET AL.,

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

AND

(4th ed. 2004).
74 The Sunshine Act was passed because "the public is entitled to the fullest
practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the Federal
Government." Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). The Act
requires that most meetings with agency members be open to the public and prohibits
PROCESS 23-40
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Each of these bodies of law creates opportunities for
democratic participation in a privatized context. However,
participation by the private entity significantly complicates the
analysis and renders exclusive reliance on these structures
difficult, if not impossible. 75 In addition, public law also offers a
variety of mechanisms designed to ensure the fairness of
government contracting processes. Chief among these are
regulations governing procurement processes.76 Finally,
inherent in the move toward privatization is a suggestion that
the market itself will stand in the place of regulatory
structures to create good policy. In the following Part, I briefly
review the feasibility of using both sets of administrative law
structures as well as the market itself to increase
accountability. In Part IV, I will argue that a substantial
reworking of elements of all these structures that takes into
account both the realities of public contracting and the power
differentials inherent in provision of social welfare services
offers some potential to increase the accountability of this
system.
A.

The Feasibilityof Relying on TraditionalAdministrative
Law Mechanisms Designed to Create Accountability in
Administrative Rulemaking and Operations

As a conceptual matter, freedom of information,
sunshine, and notice and comment laws are predicated on a
traditional
conception
of
administrative
law:
the
administrative agency is created and governed by statutory
enabling legislation, and creates and implements rules that
govern its interactions with the public. 77 To check what would
ex parte communications in formal adjudications or hearings. Id. §§ 3-4; see also 5
U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) ("General notice of proposed rule making shall be published
.... "); id. § 553(c) ('[An] agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making.... ").
75 For additional discussion of the erosion of traditional administrative law
norms raised by the contracting of government functions to public entities and the
critiques leveled at privatization as a result of that erosion, see Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1301-10
(2003); Freeman, supra note 15, at 176. For an even more general discussion of public
law concerns raised by various forms of privatization, see Minow, supra note 3, at
1246-55.
76 See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Proactive Procurement: Using New York City's
Procurement Rules to Foster Positive Human Services Policies and Serve Public Goals,
9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 331, 352-53 (2006).
77 See generally ALFRED C.
AMAN,
JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 16.1 (2d ed. 2001).
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otherwise be inappropriate power, the agency is subject to a
variety of mechanisms designed to render the conduct of the
agency more democratic.78 Meetings of the government body
are, in theory, subject to sunshine laws, allowing the public to
view the formal workings of this process. 79 Freedom of
information laws allow the public to obtain some access to
documents produced by the government, again subjecting the
agency to public scrutiny and therefore enhancing democratic
accountability.1° Notice and comment laws provide an informal
rulemaking process in which members of the public participate
in the promulgation of regulations that govern the way the
agency interacts with the public.,1 Finally, actions predicated
on claims that an administrative agency exceeded its statutory
mandates confine the ability of the government agency to
wholly circumvent the democratic checks inherent in the
2
passage of laws by publicly elected legislative bodies.
As an initial matter, each of these tools presumes that a
government agency is the primary actor. If the government is
not the actor, it is far from clear whether any of these laws
apply, leaving some doubt as to the efficacy of a litigation
strategy for addressing the concerns I raise in this Article. For
example, the relevant provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the
Sunshine Act apply, with some exceptions not relevant to this
discussion, to "agencies" defined as "each authority of the
Government of the United States."83 Thus, initially it appears,
for example, that documents produced by an entity under
contract with the government to provide welfare services may
not be available under freedom of information laws.84 Under the
78 For a general discussion of the statutory and judicial checks on
administrative actions, see PIERCE ET AL., supra note 73, at 79-226.
79 Id. at 497-98.
80 Id. at 431-73.
81 Id. at 327-43.
82 Id. at 364-408.
83 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C § 551(1) (2006). For a detailed
discussion of the significance of this restriction, see Alfred D. Aman, Proposalsfor

Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and the
Furtheranceof a Global Public Interest, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 397, 415-16

(1999).

84 For example, although CVH was able to procure data given by the vendors
to the administrative agency through the state Freedom of Information Law, it is not at
all clear under New York Law that they could have gotten any data directly from the
vendors. See, e.g., Ervin v. S. Tier Econ. Dev., Inc., 809 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (App. Div.
2006) (finding a non-profit development corporation was not an agency where its board
was comprised of private individuals, it was not subject to control by municipality of

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

same doctrine, sunshine laws may not allow one to view
meetings being held by entities under contract with the
government.
Beyond the problems raised by the applicability of the
relevant administrative law tools to a restrictive conception of
what is a "government agency" or what is "state action;" s5
however, is a fundamental distinction in administrative law,
between quasi-legislative functions of administrative agencies
on the one hand and all other functions on the other. s6
Administrative law accountability tools of the kind I have
discussed arose, fundamentally, from a concern that the
administrative state functions without the checks and balances
inherent in the other branches of government. The fear,
embodied in some conceptions of this branch of administrative
law, is that the administrative state is in effect an unelected
legislative body, able to impose its will on the public without
any form of accountability. 7 As a result, when an
administrative agency acts more like a legislature, for example,
promulgating a welfare regulation governing employment rules
or eligibility standards, it is acting in its quasi-legislative
function.8 Notice and comment and procedural mechanisms,
which allow parties to litigate against the agency if it
corporation, it did not make public the audits of its financial records, it did not hold
itself out as an agent of the municipality, and it did not disburse funds on behalf of
municipality); Farms First v. Saratoga Econ. Dev. Corp., 635 N.Y.S.2d 720, 720-21
(App. Div. 1995) (finding a non-profit corporation not subjected to Freedom of
Information Law even though it received over 50% of its revenues from the county,
where it simply contracted with the county on a fee-for-service basis). But cf Buffalo
News, Inc. v. Buffalo Enter. Dev. Corp., 619 N.E.2d 695, 696-98 (N.Y. 1994) (non-profit
local development corporation considered an "agency" for FOIL purposes as it was
"created exclusively by and for [municipality]," "required to publicly disclose its annual
budget," held itself out as an "agent" of municipality, "channel[ed] public funds into the
community," and had board members who were public officials, held offices in public
buildings, and enjoyed many attributes of public entities).
85 For a particularly compelling reconceptualization of state action doctrine,
see Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 (1995).
86 See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 73, at 282 (describing informal rulemaking
as creating procedures that "closely resemble the process of enacting legislation" and
noting that '[the agency] can act through ...issuing a notice of its intent to act,
providing an opportunity for individuals and groups to comment in writing on its
proposed action, and accompanying its final action with a statement of basis and
purpose").
87 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462, 503 (2003).
88 As a general matter, under the Administrative Procedure Act, "[any rule
that has a significant, binding effect on the substantive rights of parties will be
characterized as a legislative rule" and will be subject to the rule-making procedures in
the APA. PIERCE ET AL., supranote 73, at 322.
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promulgates a rule in excess of its statutory authority, are
applicable to those processes precisely because in theory these
processes, if unchecked, lack sufficient limitations on the power
of the administrative agency. But when the government is not
acting in a "quasi legislative" function, these protections do not
exist.
In the context of trying to create accountability in a
privatized sector of government programs, this matters because
government contracting is traditionally placed in the nonlegislative category. A prime example is the exclusion of
government contracting from the notice and comment provision
of the Administrative Procedure Act.8 9 The theory behind this
and similar exclusions is that when the government is
procuring services, for example, to build a road, it is acting
more like any other actor in the marketplace and less like a
legislature. This may make sense when applied to building a
road or entering into a contract to procure office supplies for a
government agency, but it makes significantly less sense when
the government is procuring human services.9 0
Returning to how the formal contract terms and the
informal contract mechanisms discussed above motivated the
interactions between private vendors and welfare recipients,
and the likely applicability of these findings to a wide variety of
privatized contexts, it is clear that the contracts themselves, as
well as the informal contract monitoring functions, should be
recategorized from a non-quasi legislative function into a quasi
legislative function.9 This would subject them to traditional
administrative law mechanisms. Thus, at least one potential
"solution" to the problem described above is to subject contracts
to notice and comment rulemaking. However, as Alfred Aman
has noted, and as the CVH study indicates, because informal
contract monitoring mechanisms play such a significant role in
actual contractor behavior, merely subjecting contracts
themselves to notice and comment will not fully address the
problem. As Aman discusses it,
Even if the details [of the contract] are noticed, its day-to-day
implementation may not be visible to the public.... [S]uch an
approach assumes a distinction between administration and
policymaking that does not exist in reality. The process of
administration inevitably involves policymaking, especially when
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006).
See Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 353.
91 See Aman, supranote 83, at 417.
89

90
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emergencies or unusual circumstances arise. Thus, noticing the full
details of a proposed contract with a private provider should be a
contracts
minimum requirement of the privatizing process, but these
2
themselves may need to be subject to frequent review.1

Therefore, there is a case to be made that tools such as freedom
of information and sunshine laws, notice and comment
requirements, and the state action doctrine must be expanded
to include the conduct of private entities. These strategies offer
potential avenues for increasing accountability and must be
pursued by scholars and advocates in the field. However, as
argued in Part III, without taking into account both the
radically changed nature of governance in many sectors and
issues of disproportionate power, strategies such as these may
ultimately fail to significantly enhance accountability on their
own.

93

Another body of public law that provides some
possibilities for public participation is the law governing public
procurement processes. However, this body of law focuses
almost exclusively "on ensuring low price, fairness to vendors
and the avoidance of corruption."94 Procurement mechanisms,
traditionally designed for contexts involving the delivery of
tangible good and services, "[mlay be too limited to address the
much more substantial issues that arise when government
contracts out social services and traditionally governmental
functions."95 Nevertheless, as Professor Natalie Gomez-Velez
has pointed out, and as the wide-scale use of contracting in
traditional government-run programs suggests, examination
and alteration of procurement policies to "improve the quality
of human services provided though ... contracts" can lead to
improved procurement policies.96 In Part IV of this Article, I
Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
93 For additional discussion of the problems of importing traditional public
92

law mechanisms, wholesale and without modification, to a private context, see, e.g., id.
at 417; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 574-93 (2000).
94 Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 332-33.
95 Freeman, supra note 15, at 165.

96 Gomez-Velez, supra note 76, at 333. In an extensive study of procurement
reforms in New York City, Gomez-Velez suggests that, in incorporating more
mechanisms to address the substance and quality of contracts for human services,
procurement policies are changing to accommodate values associated with the quality
of government services. Id. at 352-53. Gomez-Velez posits this change as part of what
Jody Freeman has termed "publicization," the incorporation of public law values into
formerly private settings as a means of ensuring continued adherence to Constitutional
and public law values in the face of privatization. See Freeman, supra note 75, at 130110. This term also aptly describes the project of this Article.
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suggest ways that administrative law concepts can be imported
into the procurement process to meet these ends.
B.

The Feasibility of Relying on the Market

Proponents of privatization posit the market itself as
the means to creating effective welfare programs. 97 The
previous subsections examined traditional administrative law
tools with an eye to whether they successfully created
accountability to poor communities in a contracted-out welfare
setting. The same question applies here: Does the market itself,
absent any public law intervention, offer a structure of
accountability to the poor clients of the welfare system? Will
competition inherent in market-based structures lead to
increased innovation and efficiency and ultimately to programs
that are "better" in the eyes of those served by the programs?
In a market model, a hypothetical consumer chooses one
product over another, drawing resources to the better product
and leading to the improved outcomes and efficiencies that the
market model promises.9 8 Here, given the structure of welfare
programs, it is faulty to assume that the consumer role is
played by the welfare applicant or recipient. Welfare recipients
do not choose the program to which they are assigned. Instead,
in New York City, as is no doubt the case in many jurisdictions,
they are assigned by the agency on a random basis. 9 As it is
certainly not the welfare recipient who is making choices in the
market, resources are not drawn to one vendor or another
based on the preferences of the "consumer." When one
conceives of the consumer not as the welfare recipient, but
instead as the government, who is measuring performance
based on milestones they have set, the model makes a bit more
sense.100 But from the perspective of accountability to poor
97

Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty

Programs,49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1743-49 (2002).
98 Id. at 1743.
99 MISSING THE MARK, supra note 53, at 3.

100 This Article assumes, based on CVH's data, as well as on a long history of
social welfare policy being used as a tool of subordination, discussed in Part III, that
the government is likely, if not subject to substantial outside pressure, to create
policies that do not advance the needs of poor communities. Although a full discussion
of market failures in the more traditional senses is beyond the scope of this Article,
there are at least two fundamental market failures that can lead to inefficiencies. First,
for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to maintain sufficient competition for contracts to
lead to optimal market results. What tends to happen, instead, is that even if a
significant number of entities initially compete for a particular contract, over time
vendors tend to become established as the providers for a particular program. SANGER,
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communities, the ESP program data clearly indicates that the
government does not stand in the shoes of program clients in
choosing where to direct resources. In the ESP program, 92% of
the population were not placed and 76% were punished. 10 1
Despite these dismal outcomes, the contracts were renewed
12
with very few changes to the incentive payment structure. 1
Had welfare recipients done the choosing, it is difficult to
imagine that the program would have received such an
endorsement. In fact, if one allows CVH to speak for the
community, it is quite clear that welfare recipients considered
the program a failure and would have reconfigured it much
03
more substantially.1
This accountability failure is not surprising. As Martha
Minow aptly observes,

supra note 7, at 19. For an egregious example of the way in which competition can be
eliminated in a privatized welfare context, see Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized
Welfare State, supra note 4, at 261-62. Kennedy describes the attempted buy out by
Citibank EBT Services of Transactive which, if successful, would have given Citibank
monopoly control over electronic benefits transfer systems in thirty-three states. Id.
Second, because government has turned over the running of the program to a private
entity, the capacity of the government to run the program without the vendor
decreases. See, e.g., Privatizationin Practice:Human Services, supra note 35, at 145051. As a result of these parallel trends, the vendors begin to have monopoly control
over the program and the government becomes captive to the vendors. Under any
analysis, this does not lead to efficient markets. For an extensive discussion of these
and other phenomena in the contracting out of welfare services, see SANGER, supra
note 7, at 16-21. In addition, government typically has difficulty building sufficient
expertise to monitor vendor performance. As M. Bryna Sanger has noted, "[g]rowth in
contracting must be accompanied by an equal growth in government's ability to
manage and monitor contractor behavior, but there are indications that these
developments do not necessarily coincide." Id. at 16; see also Freeman, supra note 15,
at 171-72. So, even assuming good intentions on the part of government actors, there
are substantial reasons to suspect the ability of the market to lead to "good" outcomes.
101 See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
102 Compare note 43 (detailing the contract payment structure in the ESP
contract), with note 53 (detailing the contract payment structure in the Back to Work
program). The Back to Work program differed from the ESP program in that it
combined within it the services originally provided under ESP with assessment and
employment planning services previously provided under a different set of contracts
during the time that ESP was in effect. MISSING THE MARK, supra note 53, at 23-24.
Thus, the contracts included incentive payments totaling 10% for provision of those
services. However, the incentives connected to the provision of employment services
changed only slightly, by placing some more emphasis on very short term retention
(thirty days) and some targeting of services to special populations (those under welfare
time limits or sanctions). For example, under ESP the vendors received 25% at
placement, 45% at three month retention, and 25% at six months with a high wage
bonus, whereas under Back to Work the placement and retention payments were 30%
at 30 day placement, 30% at 90 day retention, and 25% at 180 day retention. Id. at 79;
supranote 43 and accompanying text.
103 See supra Part I.B.3.
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With social services, including welfare-to-work transition assistance,
...accountability becomes especially important but also recalcitrant,
because those most directly affected by the services or failures to
provide services are politically and economically ineffectual.
Treatment of vulnerable populations simply does not work well in
or upon political
markets that depend upon consumer rationality
10 4
processes that demand active citizen monitoring.

Given the lack of an active consumer whose interests
are aligned with poor communities, it seems that the market
offers fewer rather than more opportunities to create
accountability. Matthew Diller has persuasively argued that
while welfare's move to privatization has been characterized by
its proponents as technocratic-seeking increased efficiency
and innovation-this explanation is insufficient and deceptive.
Diller instead views privatization as a means to obscure the
making of welfare policy from public scrutiny.015 As he observes,
One of the consequences of the technocratic basis of privatization in
welfare is that critical policy decisions are made in obscure ways.
The actual content of programs is determined through contract
provisions governing performance measurement, governmental
oversight and financial incentive structures. All of these features are
generally hidden from public view by their sheer technical
complexity. To make matters worse, the process of drafting and
negotiating the critically important contractual terms is largely
closed to public input." 6

Minow, supra note 3, at 1262. The unsuitability of the market to create
accountability in a setting such as the contracting out of welfare has also been noted by
Alfred Aman:
104

Too often ... the politics of privatization and the market populism that is
often a dominant part of the political rhetoric that comes into play make it
seem as if the privatization of prisons or the determination of welfare
eligibility were similar to the regulation of airlines or cable television. The
transparency that comes with consumers or customers voting with their feet,
as it were, is not likely to materialize in the context of such privatized
governmental services without processes designed to provide the kind of
information that can empower citizens and make their participation
meaningful.
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization:
Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1477, 1496 (2001).
105 Diller, supra note 97, at 1757.
106 Id. In some senses, privatization can be seen as taking the process by
which power is granted to local government to administer welfare programs even
further and in a way that entirely undermines any apparent positive benefit to the
recipient. For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon prior to 1996, see HANDLER,
supranote 5, at 42-49.
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In New York City, the imposition of policies that harm
rather than help poor communities was being obscured through
the use of contracting. In fact, the ESP case study provides
substantial evidence to suggest that this is in fact precisely the
role of privatization of this program. In this instance,
privatization created a situation where extraordinarily
punitive policies were imposed on welfare recipients through
the use of contracting. 10 7 Ironically, the study also suggests that
under a market model, rather than functioning inefficiently as
suggested by many scholars,"8 the system actually functions
extraordinarily well in rendering the poor of New York City
tremendously vulnerable to the vagaries of the low wage labor
market and doing so without any real accountability to either
the public or the affected communities.109

107

HearingSeries on Welfare Reform, Work Requirements on the TANF Cash

Welfare Program:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Steve Savner, Senior Staff Att'y,
Center for Law and Social Policy). This data raises even more concerns when one looks
at both outcome and service provision data through the lens of race. Although CVH
was not able to break down outcome data by race, some national data suggests that
both outcome and the quality of service provision vary along race lines. Id. In
Wisconsin in 1995 through 1996, "61 percent of the white families receiving assistance
left the caseload, compared to 36 percent of the African-American families." Id. In
Illinois, leaver data from June 1997 to June 1999 revealed racial disparities in the
reasons for case closure. Id. In that period,
[a] total of 340,958 cases closed ... , of which 102,423 were whites and
238,535 were minorities. Fifty-four percent of minority cases, but only 39
percent of white cases, closed because the recipient failed to comply with
program rules. Though earned income made 40 percent of white families
ineligible for support, earned income made only 27 percent of minority
families ineligible.
Id. In addition, various studies indicate better treatment of white recipients than
African American recipients in regard to positive encouragement and assistance in job
search and provision of supportive assistance such as transportation help. Id.
108 See supra note 100.
109 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 31 (2001). The disturbing "efficiency" of the market in
imposing harsh penalties on poor communities is not surprising. As Katz notes, this
kind of "market success" has been manifested in a variety of privatized programs:
The women forced to claim public assistance in order to survive exert little if
any influence over the design of newly "marketized" welfare policies. The real
exchange links politicians and their constituencies. The commodity is votes,
and the desired outcome is reduced welfare rolls, regardless of what happens
to those rejected for benefits or terminated from assistance.
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CREATING SOLUTIONS: CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

Given the wide scope of contracting out of traditional
government welfare functions and the effect of that
transformation on the ability of communities to create
accountability in program design and implementation, new
administrative law structures must be created to advance these
values. Part III details the conceptual underpinnings for the
creation of such administrative law structures while Part IV
identifies practical accountability structures that might serve
these ends. These conceptual underpinnings rely on three
bodies of scholarship: "new governance" theory, social science
literature documenting the historical subordination in social
welfare programs, and community/rebellious lawyering
scholarship. To create accountability in privatized programs
traditionally characterized by subordination, new governance
structures provide a politically promising means of reform.
However,
given the disproportionate power between
government and welfare recipients and the long history of the
use of social welfare programs to subordinate poor
communities,
these
governance
structures
must
be
significantly re-conceptualized. Community participation must
be transformed from mere tokenism into substantive
participation by poor communities. In addition, the insights of
community/rebellious lawyering scholarship argue for making
the source of that participation grassroots organizing groups. 110
A.

The Administrative Law Framework Offered by New
Governance Scholarship

Although definitional frames and boundaries are hotly
contested,"' new governance scholars seek to build a conceptual
bridge between those administrative law scholars that
advocate the strengthening of New Deal-based centralized
regulatory structures and those scholars from the law and
economics school that seek to rely on market forces to create
efficiency." 2 Seeking a third way between these two schools,
"1o See infra Part IV.A.4.
111 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, "New Governance" in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 (2004) (responding to Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342 (2004)).
112 See generally, e.g., Freeman, supra note 93.
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scholars in this field describe a new paradigm, "a key strength
... [of which] is its explicit suggestion that economic efficiency
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing."113 For
the purposes of this Article, this body of scholarship is
particularly compelling because it accepts the shift to market
structures and theory inherent in so much of current
governance and attempts to impose accountability in light of
these shifts.
In seeking new administrative law paradigms, these
scholars describe movements away from both top-down
regulation and "deregulation" in the law and economics sense,
and towards a collaborative, "softer" model where a variety of
stakeholders work together to create, implement, and
continually
renegotiate
programmatic
structure
and
implementation.114 This scholarship engages directly with the
newly configured modes of governance of which privatization is
a major component.
New governance frameworks put a premium on
experimentation and means of learning from experimentation.
Fundamentally, they put far less emphasis on centralized,
expert decision-makers and "broaden[] the decision-making
playing field by involving more actors in the various stages of
the legal process. It also diversifies the types of expertise and
experience that these new actors bring to the table."',,
Among the key players included in this broadened set of
governing actors are third parties, non-government actors
enlisted to administer public functions, "such as the delivery of
social services. Sharing tasks and responsibilities with the
private sector creates more interdependence between
government and the market. In turn, increased participation
leads to fluid and permeable boundaries between private and
public."116
New governance
structures
are also,
ideally,
characterized
by
increased
collaboration.
Individuals
participating in the governance scheme "are involved in the
113
114

Lobel, supra note 111, at 344.
See also Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 473 (describing new governance

scholarship as endeavoring "simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize,
and advocate a seismic reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the
tools employed in policy implementation.., generally away from the familiar model of
command-style, fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of
collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving New Governance").
115 Lobel, supra note 111, at 373.
116 Id. at 374.
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process of developing the norms of behavior and changing
them."11 7 Individuals interact over time, share information and
responsibility, and continually renegotiate and reconfigure
program structures as their collective understanding evolves.
"In a cooperative regime, the role of government changes from
regulator and controller to facilitator, and law becomes a
shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering
activity.""'
New
governance
frameworks
also
reject
the
centralization and standardization characterized by New Deal
structures and instead embrace localization, competition,
solutions derived from the particular needs and circumstances
of those closest to the problem, solutions that cross over
traditional boundaries between areas of law, and a kind of
perpetual experimentation inherent in multiple, ongoing
collaborations.1 9 Related to collaboration is a concept of
heterogeneity of approaches and continuous improvement as a
result of this ability of multiple, often private, actors to
approach
problems
from multiple perspectives.
New
governance structures are envisioned as inherently dynamic
and experimentalist in nature. 210
Finally, a fundamental aspect of new governance
of "orchestration."121
possibility
the
is
frameworks
Orchestration requires that "decentralization ... be coupled
with regional and national commitments to coordinate local
efforts and communicate lessons in a comprehensive
manner."1 22 In theory, orchestration allows the government to
identify a problem in need of solving and then "promote and
standardize innovations that began locally and privately.
Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good
practices, and researching and replicating success stories from
local or private levels are central goals of government."1 23 In a
very real sense, the power of the government in this conception
is the power of the purse. 124 Government calls for and supports

117
118

Id. at 377.
Id.

119 Id. at 379-86.
120 Id. at 396.
121 Id. at 400.
122

123
124

Id.
Id. at 400-01.
Freeman, supra note 75, at 1285.
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innovation, evaluates proposals, and then encourages both best
practices and continued experimentation.
New governance frameworks offer a promising means of
creating accountability in contracted-out welfare programs for
a variety of reasons. First is the political feasibility of the
project. As discussed in Part I, privatization and large-scale
collaborations between government and private entities
increasingly dominate welfare programs. 125 Theories and
strategies that question, slow, and alter this process are an
essential part of any comprehensive advocacy strategy to
respond to privatization. 126 However, the dominance of
privatization in the provision of previously government-run
welfare programs and the current welfare program strategies
require engagement with the ideologies and practices of
market-based, privatized structures.
Second, in the midst of substantial data suggesting that
privatization failed in New York City, although the data was
sparse and merited further research, CVH did find that some
ESP vendors were slightly better for program clients than
others. 127 In this sense, the CVH report teaches that
experimentation can be of value and program design should, in
the right circumstances, encourage this innovation and
learning. Any endorsement of experimentation implicitly
endorses a move away from specific, judicially enforceable hard
rules of conduct by welfare workers. Lawyers who have spent
their careers seeking to create and enforce detailed rules for
the conduct of welfare workers on the ground may find this
suggestion, in some senses, near heresy. 28 However, detailed,
top-down rule making has historically been beset by significant
implementation
challenges
on the ground. 129 If the
experimental, collaborative processes envisioned by new
governance theory were structured to ensure significant
participation by and accountability to low income communities,
125
126

See supra Parts IA, I.B.1.
Several scholars have focused considerable attention on strategies and

theories that would slow privatization. See Freeman, supra note 93, at 574-93.
127 THE REVOLVING DOOR, supra note 8, at 20. For example, vendor six month
retention figures varied from a low of 10% to a high of 20%. Id. at 33-34. While most
vendors reported that they could focus almost no resources and attention on services to
promote job retention, one vendor developed a program to enhance retention. Id. at 3334, 37.
128 As a lawyer and clinician who relies on and continues to enforce hard rules
on behalf of my individual clients, I offer these proposals with a deep understanding of
this hesitation.
129 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 3, at 1242-43.
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then those structures may be more effective than the top-down
regulatory structures in creating positive welfare policy.130
B.

The Challenges to New Governance StructuresPosed by
DisproportionatePower

New governance theory offers a politically feasible and
potentially promising framework for change. However, the
130 The degree and nature of the "softness" is hotly contested by a variety of
new governance scholars. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 486-89. The concept
of "softness" refers, in part, to a move away from exclusive reliance on formal
accountability mechanisms such as sanctions for failure to comply with regulatory
mandates and from a capacity to sue on the basis of agency disregard for its own rules
and a move toward an expansion of the means by which multiple actors can participate
in governance decision-making and the means by which the government can intervene
to control outcomes. Involved are a variety of inducements toward good behavior, such
as performance incentives. Lobel, supra note 111, at 390. In addition, new governance
concepts can include "variation in the communications of intention to control and
discipline deviance." Id. at 391. A prime example of the new sanction regime is an
increased reliance on government support of multiple approaches to problem solving.
"For example, recently adopted performance-based regulation, designed to allow a
range of reasonable interpretations that can meet the legal requirement of comparable
outcomes, promotes flexibility in the means adopted to achieve the specified goals." Id.
at 391-92. Despite the variability in possible outcomes permissible under these
regulatory frameworks, many scholars argue that the frameworks do involve
government retention of significant coercive power. For example, Michael Dorf and
Charles Sabels vision of

democratic experimentalism, [a leading new governance concept,] ...
contemplates mandatory participation in local problem-solving experiments
under the discipline of mandatory (but rolling) minimum performance
standards set and periodically revised by a central coordinating body, coupled
with a reserved coercive power on the part of the center to intervene for
purposes of forcing reconsideration and reconfiguration of local experiments
gone seriously awry.
Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 488 (citing Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (citation

omitted)). Despite these arguments, however there is no question that allowing
experimentation and diversity of approaches and endorsing a move to incentive- rather
than mandate-based regimes raises a disturbing spectre for recipients of welfare
programs. In short, without hard rules, it is difficult to compel outcomes, and, as the
CVH report makes abundantly clear, when a set of rules focuses entirely on outcome,
whether it be in a performance-based contract or a performance-based regulation, the
means of implementation are not subject to rules. This is problematic for a variety of
reasons. If there are no rules about the means used, it is far more difficult for
advocates to control interactions between the government (or private party acting on
behalf of the government) and the person being served by the program. Even given
their failures, traditional accountability mechanisms create a clear means for
intervention that does produce some level of results. For example, even given the
structural problems in the implementation of the settlement discussed at the beginning
of this Article, it did allow the mandating of hard rules and clear sanctions for systemic
noncompliance. Abandoning such tools, however limited, seems foolhardy. For this
reason, although this Article advocates the investment of advocacy resources in the
creation of governance structures that augment community participation and input, its
suggestions should be critically evaluated in light of these risks.
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accountability problem inherent in the privatization of welfare
programs, as revealed by CVH, is that the government's actual
goals differed substantially from those of the community. CVH
sought programs that would help move people from welfare
into sustainable employment, while, arguably, the government
sought and endorsed a punishment and caseload reduction
mechanism. 13 ' Looking at this program through the framework
of new governance theory, the governance process was deficient
in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, there were only two
constituents who were party to the creation of the programthe government and the vendors.132 On a very basic level, if the
structure offered by new governance scholarship is one of
broad-based, multi-constituent collaboration, then ESP was
fundamentally flawed in that the affected constituency was not
at the table. And the solution is, at a minimum, to bring the
clients into the collaborative governance structure. However,
this statement begs the far more complicated questions of how
to bring a party or community into a collaboration when (1) the
parties to be included (here welfare recipients) have
substantially less political power than anyone else at the table,
and (2) even more disturbingly, the program at issue has
historically been used to subordinate the clients it purports to
serve.
The effects of disproportionate power and subordination
have been the topic of some new governance scholarship. New
governance structures are least effective, in terms of holding
true to the democratic participatory values of administrative
law, when key figures in a particular system do not wield
sufficient political power to participate in these collaborative
governance structures. As Bradley Karkkainen frames it, "[a]
central challenge for the governance model is ... to understand
how collaborative environments can be nurtured to produce
equitable results, especially in settings where vast power
imbalances exist."133 Although there are valuable suggestions in
the literature as to how to begin to solve this problem134 and
some discussion of moments when true power was wielded by
historically less-powerful groups in a new governance
131
132

See supra Part I.B.3.
See generally Gomez-Velez, supra note 76 (describing New York City's

procurement process).
133 Karkkainen, supra note 111, at 458-59.
134 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 3, at 216-27; Minow, supra note 3, at 1266-70;
see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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framework, 135 the practical problem of what governance
structures might be put in place to address these issues
remains underdeveloped.
In a new governance environment, problems with
accountability to any particular entity or interest group tend to
arise when that entity or group does not have the political
power to affect process and outcome. From the perspective of
democratic accountability, when all relevant entities or parties
possess sufficient political power to participate in a meaningful
way in governance structures, accountability problems tend not
to arise. A few examples demonstrate this point.
In Down from Bureaucracy, Joel Handler examines the
consequences
of
decentralization,
deregulation,
and
privatization for "citizen empowerment."136 He seeks to
determine whether, given the shift towards these new
governance structures, "ordinary citizens-clients, patients,
teachers, students, parents, tenants, neighbors-have more or
fewer opportunities to exercise control over decisions that affect
their lives. "1 7 One prime example, discussed by Handler as one
where democratic accountability problems tend not to arise, is
the use, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
1
(OSHA), of the "Voluntary Protection Program. "138
This
program is a system of self-regulation in which labor
management committees are formed and work together to
develop and implement health and safety inspection standards
and protocols.139 In particular, Handler describes a study by
Joseph Rees on the use of voluntary regulatory structures in
the California Cooperative Compliance Program. 140 In that
program, joint labor management committees acted as a
surrogate for the OSHA inspector, and the role of the OSHA
inspector shifted from direct inspection to, in many
circumstances, "problem solving consultant.""4 According to
Rees' study, this particular program was tremendously
successful in the sense that it resulted in far lower accident

See HANDLER, supra note 5, chs. 5-8.
See id at 5.
137 Id. at 5.
138 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration,
Voluntary Protection Programs, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008).
139 Id.
135
136

140 HANDLER, supra note 5, at 134-39.
141 Id. at 137.
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rates than comparable sites. 142 Rees and Handler attribute this

success to a variety of factors, the most important of which,
according to Handler, was the consistent presence of strong
unions at successful sites.143 In short, strong unions ensured
that labor participation was meaningful and that the interests
of the workers who would suffer accidents as a result of health
and safety hazards were consistently represented and
accounted for.
In contrast to the OSHA example where the affected
constituency, the workers, possessed sufficient political power
to compel outcomes in their favor, is the implementation of the
Workforce Investment Act ("WIA) 14" in Springfield,
Massachusetts. In this example, the affected constituency,
potential clients of the workforce investment system, initially
had little if any role in policy creation and had to resort to an
outsider, organizing strategy to augment their political capital.
WIA, in many ways a model new governance structure,
illustrates the continuing challenges for these structures. The
WIA-enabling legislation mandates the creation of local
workforce investment boards with broad membership,
including client membership, and policy setting authority.-4
While WIA appears to function successfully in fostering
increased accountability in some localities,146 the Anti142
143

144
145

Id. at 138.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 2832 (2006).

Id. § 2832. WIA incorporates many new governance concepts. The statute

calls for the creation of local workforce investment boards that must bring together a
wide variety of stakeholders in state and local boards to govern the provision of
workforce development services. Id. § 2832(a)-(d). Local boards include members from
major constituencies and are responsible for local oversight and administration. The
local board negotiates performance measures with the state and is accountable for
meeting those performance measures. Id. § 2832(d)(5). Under WIA, the program design
is created through the participation of this broad group of actors, and jurisdictions
function under performance mandates that leave substantial room for experimentation.
See id. § 2871 (describing the performance accountability system for workforce
investment systems). WIA also incorporates some accountability and transparency
concepts from traditional administrative law. WIA requires that proceedings of the
workforce investment boards be open to the public and that certain documents be
available for public scrutiny. Id. § 2832(e). It also requires that plans be available for
comment prior to their approval. Id. § 2832(e). In theory, WIA structures create
opportunities for community participation, thus generating accountability. Lobel, supra
note 111, at 411.
146 Lobel cites, as a prime example of the effectiveness of WIA policy in a new
governance framework, the work of Project QUEST in San Antonio, Texas. Lobel, supra
note 111 at 413-15. Project QUEST has been cited as one of the most successful job
training programs in the country. Paul Osterman, Organizing the US Labor Market:
National Problems, Community Strategies, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A

NEW ECONOMY 289 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubeck eds., 2003). It grew, beginning
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Displacement Project (the "A-DP"), an institutionally based
membership organization controlled by low-income people and
located in Springfield, Massachusetts,47 came to a very
different conclusion about the implementation of WIA policy in
their jurisdiction. Strikingly, despite the presence of new
governance structures in the form of rolling performance
mandates and governance by state and local workforce
investment
boards
mandated
to
have
community
representation, clients of the system appeared initially unable
to participate meaningfully in setting local WIA priorities. 14 1
Nevertheless, the new governance structure that characterizes
WIA ultimately appeared to play some role in facilitating
49
significant accountability to the community.1
In 2001, using a strategy remarkably similar to that
utilized by CVH, the A-DP set out to monitor implementation
of WIA in their jurisdiction. 50 Strikingly, the data revealed by
in 1991, from the work of community activists in San Antonio who focused on the
experiences and needs of low income members of its organizations. Id. at 254. These
organizing groups ultimately designed a program, Project QUEST, that provided long
term training, modest financial support of program participants during training, and
direct linkages with jobs at the conclusion of the program. Id. at 255. Project QUEST
was not only tremendously successful in its placement rate and the wage gains realized
by participants, but it assisted in reforming the community college system, altered the
hiring patterns of employers, and augmented the larger organizing goals of the
community organizing groups that developed it. Id. at 256-57. The relationship
between the development and success of this program and WIA is not entirely clear.
Although causation is difficult to identify, it appears fair to speculate that Project
QUEST's success could have arisen, like that of the union workers in the OSHA
context, initially from the political power of the membership organizations that led to
the formation and ongoing support of the project. Once developed and backed by the
considerable political power of the organizing groups, the governance structures of WIA
clearly supplemented rather than hindered local support of the program.
147 Alliance to Develop Power, http://www.a-dp.org/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2008). The mission of the A-DP is as follows:
The Alliance to Develop Power, (formerly Anti-Displacement Project) based in
the three counties of Western Massachusetts, has undertaken a set of bold
initiatives in community organizing, civic engagement, cooperative economic
development, and community building activities. ADP has instituted a model
that prioritizes leadership development, cooperative principles, and moving a
membership into action, while simultaneously winning major policy reforms,
preserving thousands of units of housing, developing community-owned
businesses, and operating the region's only membership based low wage and
immigrant worker center affiliated with the local and national AFL-CIO.
Id.
148 ANTI-DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, FUTUREWORKS: ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESS,
How FUTUREWORKS IS A DEAD END STREET FOR Low WAGE WORKERS (2001)
[hereinafter FUTUREWORKS] (on file with author).
149 See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
150 FUTUREWORKS, supra note .148. The A-DP created a leader-driven testing
project to explore the training services provided under the WIA. Id. Over a two-month
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CVH and the A-DP were quite similar.- The A-DP research
revealed a program that failed to provide access to the
education, training, and other essential services sought by the
clients.151 Both programs failed to meet the clients' selfarticulated needs and compromised the ability of poor people to
succeed in the labor market. In both programs, clients wanted
to build skills that would enable them to move towards
economic sustainability, and in both cases they were almost
uniformly denied these opportunities and diverted into the lowwage labor market.
The results revealed by CVH and the A-DP are, sadly,
consistent with the history of social welfare programs and
policies. Although government actors have, often in response to
pressure from a variety of fronts, 153 designed some programs
that have advanced the interests of program participants,
social welfare policy over the course of American history has
been dominated by systems and programs that serve primarily
to control against political unrest and maintain a workforce
that has little option but to accept unstable, low-wage
employment.154
Social welfare policy is often fairly
characterized primarily as a means of labor market control and
a bulwark against social unrest rather than as a system to
meet the real needs of program participants. Social welfare

period, leaders went into the WIA administered One-Stop Career Center and
documented their experiences. The A-DP identified thirty-two people who were either
low-wage workers, unemployed, or welfare recipients. Id. The "testers" were a multiracial, multi-ethnic team who had varying needs and skill levels. The testers made a
total of forty-two visits to the Future Works One-Stop Career Center with specific
requests such as "I want to get computer training" or "I'm looking for a job in
childcare." Id. Testers also documented language access as well as the availability of
services such as transportation and childcare assistance. After each visit, the testers
met with the testing coordinator and documented their overall experience, what they
asked for, and what they were told. Id.
151 It is, however, worth noting that the A-DP's research methods were
significantly less rigorous than CVH's, so limited conclusions can be drawn from it.
Nevertheless, the results are striking.
152 Everything testers asked for and documented was an eligible activity
within the Workforce Investment Act. None of the forty-two tests resulted in
enrollment in a skill development or training program. FUTUREWORKS, supra note 148.
153 A review of the extensive victories of advocates and communities in
fighting on behalf of those in poverty is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
interesting history of the legal and organizing movements, see MARTHA F. DAVIS,
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993); see
also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK: FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2000).
154 See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING
THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (1971).
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policy is also characterized by a long and shameful history of
155
contributing to gender and race subordination.
Welfare reform after 1996 only added to this long
history. While welfare rolls have plummeted, former welfare
recipients have been pushed off of welfare and into the lowwage labor market. 56 They are off welfare, but on the whole
they have not moved towards any form of economic security.
Jobs into which former welfare recipients have been pushed
fall to women who suffer financially in comparison to their
male colleagues in the workplace,'15 and what few positive
outcomes come from welfare reform appear to fall
58
disproportionately to white recipients.
When viewed through this historical lens, the results
revealed by CVH and the A-DP are not surprising. If in fact
social welfare programs have historically been and continue to
be used to subordinate poor communities, then one expects
155

See, e.g., KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM:

PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR (2001); JILL QUADAGNO, THE
COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). See

generally LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND (Randy Albelda &
Ann Withorn eds., 2002); WHOSE WELFARE (Gwendolyn Mink ed., 1999).
156 See HEATHER BOUSHEY & DAVID ROSNICK, CTR. ON ECON. & POLY
RESEARCH, JOBS HELD BY FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS HIT HARD BY ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN
(2003),
available
at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/pubhcations/welfarereform_2003_09.pdf. According to
Boushey and Rosnick,
Nine industries, mostly in the service sector, account for the employment of
nearly two-thirds of all former welfare recipients. Overall, these are
relatively low-wage industries: in the second quarter of 2003, retail had an
average hourly wage of $10.64 while food establishments averaged $6.94 per
hour (not including tips), both of which were much lower than the $13.94
average for the private sector as a whole.

Id.; see also Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a
New Poverty Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POLLY 201, 216 (2006); Julia R. Henly,
Informal Support Networks and the Maintenance of Low-Wage Jobs, in LABORING
BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND
SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 179 (Frank Munger ed., 2002).

157 See Vicki Lens, Work Sanctions Under Welfare Reform: Are they Helping
Women Achieve Self-Sufficiency?, 13 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 255, 281 n.130 (2006).

Lens summarizes various statistics showing that
[albout two-thirds of former recipients work in service sector jobs, such as
retail, eating and drinking establishments, and personal care services.
Service sector jobs are often predominantly female; for example, in 2004,
91.8% of nursing, psychiatric, and home health aid workers were women, as
were 89.7% of all maids and housekeeping cleaners. These jobs are among the
lowest paying of all occupations; for example the median hourly wage for
personal care and service occupations is $8.59 an hour.

Id.
158

See supranote 107.
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precisely these results: WIA would fail to provide training that
would render participants more expensive to employers, and
New York City contractors would be rewarded for placing
disproportionately high numbers of recipients in highly
unstable low-wage jobs, would not be penalized for failing to
provide program participants with any marketable skills, and
would be rewarded for punishing the vast majority of clients.
The contracts CVH described, and the welfare reform
movement of which they are a key part, have the effect of
giving recipients little option but to subject themselves to the
vagaries of the low-wage labor market. The difference between
this privatized context and earlier forms of policy creation and
implementation is, then, not so much the effect of policies but
the specific structural contractual framework that has made
successful interventions by low-income communities even more
difficult.
Thus, in important senses, the programs that CVH and
the A-DP faced and mobilized against were strikingly similar.
However, the results of the A-DP's work suggest that the new
governance framework in WIA may have provided more
opportunities for the community group to intervene in the
governance structure in a way that increased accountability to
program clients. Using the results of this testing project to
mobilize substantial opposition to the WIA system in
Springfield, the A-DP reached an agreement with several key
terms. The for-profit entity running the one stop system was
forced to transform into a "non-profit governed by a local board
of directors.""1 9 The A-DP was granted a seat on the Regional
Employment Board. 160 In addition, the Regional Employment
Board agreed to
set aside 50 percent of all federal WorkForce Investment Act funds
for job training and education for low-income adults, [ensure that] all
low-income job seekers receive training within 45 days of their initial
entry to FutureWorks, [create] a grievance process for career center
customers and [establish] a system to track wages and benefits in job
placements as well as success rates for training programs. 6 '
159

Lori Stabile, Career Center Changes Focus: Now Non-Profit FutureWorks

Meets Demands of Community, THE REPUBLICAN, Dec. 9, 2001, at D2.
160 Lori Stabile, Jobs Group Marks Approval of Reforms, SPRINGFIELD UNION
NEWS, Nov. 1, 2001, at All.
161 Stabile, supra note 159. Throughout the campaign, The Springfield Union
News and other local papers provided extensive coverage of the campaign and its
results. E.g., Stephanie Barry, Angry Protests Invades Board Meeting, SPRINGFIELD
UNION NEWS, Mar. 22, 2001, at B4; Elizabeth Zuckerman, Career Center Focus of
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Some of these successes appear to stem in part from the
participatory nature of the structures governing design and
implementation of workforce strategies under WIA. For
example, the existence of the regional board as a target of the
A-DP's activism, the award of a seat on that board to the A-DP,
and the emphasis on performance measurement are all closely
related to new governance theories of broad-based participation
and performance-driven policy. 162 In essence, by leveraging
information accessed not primarily as a result of the structure
of WIA but instead as a result of an organizing and research
strategy, the A-DP raised their political capital sufficiently to
become members of the collaborative governance structure and
to effect significant change in WIA policy in favor of their
constituency.
The A-DP and CVH examples teach important lessons
about how new governance structures can be formulated to
increase accountability. First, the A-DP story offers a caution
that the mere presence of broad participation inherent in WIA's
enabling legislation or any other proposed governance
structure can be an empty shell if there is no mechanism for
substantive participation by the affected constituency. Second,
one of the key lessons of the story told by CVH and, by analogy
told by the A-DP is that programs that purport to serve welfare
recipients by assisting them in moving from welfare to work
often actually function very differently, rewarding contractors
for punishing welfare recipients and placing the vast majority
of clients at the mercy of the low-wage labor market without
any enhancement of skills or marketability. In effect, the use
of contracting enabled the government to create and perpetuate
a program that subordinated rather than assisted its clients.
Thus, in addition to the multiple opportunities for
collaboration that new governance structures offer, there must
be mechanisms to counteract the tendency of both government
and private entities to perpetuate the subordination of clients
in these programs. In short, if one turns to the collaborative,
offered by new governance
experimental frameworks
Debate, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, Apr. 18, 2001, at B3; Maureen Turner, Activists

Inflicted the First Wound to a Local Job Center-Now the PoliticalSharks Are Circling,
THE VALLEY ADVOCATE, May 23, 2001; Chris Hamel, FutureWorks Center Faces Shaky
Future, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 3, 2001, at A13; Stephanie Barry, Changes in
the Works for TrainingCenter, SPRINGFIELD UNION NEWS, June 6, 2001, at Al.
162 See supra notes 115-123.
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scholarship, one must ensure that, for programs characterized
by disproportionate power and a history of subordination, the
seat at the table reserved for program clients is a real seat.
Finally, a note on community organizing and lawyering.
A central task of the administrative law mechanism that this
Article seeks to describe is the facilitation of substantive
participation by welfare recipients and other members of poor
communities in the creation of welfare policy. In this sense,
this Article joins a variety of scholars and activists who seek to
use lawyering and legal structures as a means to augment
organizing campaigns. 163 As argued above, given the history of
subordination, participation that rises above mere tokenism is
difficult to achieve without a significant alteration of the
structures and mechanisms of participation.'6 However, even
with a substantial reworking of structures of collaborative
modes of participation, if there is no person or group of people
who have the time, resources, and authenticity to speak on
behalf of communities, the project simply will not work. One
viable answer to this problem, which finds its roots in
community lawyering principles, is to turn to community-based
grassroots organizing as the best hope for capturing and
amplifying the opinions, needs, and goals of poor communities
as well as exercising the power necessary to communicate and
negotiate for these needs. Thus, to the extent that that this
Article envisions structures that will create a "real seat at the
table" for affected communities, that seat must be reserved for
grassroots organizing groups.

163 An expansive discussion of law and organizing is outside the scope of this
Article. However, some particularly important texts in the law and organizing field
include: GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and
Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460-69
(2001); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407
(1995); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering
and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699 (1988). For an extraordinarily useful introduction to
the literature of this growing field, see Loretta Price & Melinda Davis, Seeds of
Change:A BibliographicIntroduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 615 (2001).
164 See supra text accompanying notes 133-158.
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COMMUNITY-BASED, RESEARCH-DRIVEN PARTICIPATION
AS A POTENTIAL RESPONSE

Part III recognized that, for a wide variety of reasons,
new governance structures provide a promising framework for
creating accountability in privatized social service programs
only if these structures create meaningful participation for
those historically subordinated beneficiaries of the programs.
Drawing on the concepts of collaboration, experimentation, and
accountability at the root of new governance theory, and the
lessons from the successful work of CVH and A-DP, this Part
proposes the creation of social service contract monitoring
bodies as a means to render meaningful community
participation in the governance structure. 165 These bodies would
broaden the participants in the formulation of policy and,
essentially, would provide a structural means to augment and
build on the political power of community-based groups in a
way that would significantly enhance their ability to
participate in policy creation.
The proposed monitoring body is a separate entity that
provides substantial oversight over all aspects of contracting
Some new governance scholars have suggested augmenting new
governance structures in much more limited forms with community-based oversight
mechanisms. For example, in her discussion of nursing homes in The Contracting
State, Jody Freeman suggests ways that contracts can be used to increase
accountability and suggests methods that are in line with mine. For instance, she
suggests that "contracts could be instruments for diversifying sources of oversight. For
example, a contract could establish an ombudsman to represent nursing home
residents, or it could demand that nursing homes submit to periodic review by a
community oversight committee." Freeman, supra note 15, at 202. Similarly, she
suggests, in discussing Medicaid contracts (MCOs), that
165

[tihe contracts themselves could constitute crucial accountability
mechanisms, enabling state agencies to demand submission to independent
third-party oversight, private accreditation, and insurance requirements,
among other things. Contracts might thus serve as a means of enlisting
additional nongovernmental entities such as community groups and patient
advocates to provide accountability.
Id. at 203-04 (citing examples in Massachusetts and Wisconsin that ensure community
participation in Medicaid contracting). Likewise, in discussing welfare-to-work
contracts and concluding that there is a significant lack of public accountability,
Barbara Bezdek proposes the creation of a "Community Congress to be held quarterly,
to elicit the input of TANF customers and affected communities, including locally
operating employers, as a source of guidance for the services offered by vendors."
Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORIHAM
URB. L.J. 1559, 1609 (2001). Finally, in Public and Private Partnerships, Martha

Minow points to contract law as a promising place of intervention to increase
accountability in a privatized social service environment. Minow, supra note 3, at 1267.
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for social services. It ensures that contracting processes are
transparent and that the voices and priorities of potential
recipients of the service under contract have the resources and
structural mechanisms to meaningfully influence contract
166
structures.
The monitoring body could be created by either the
legislative branch of local government or by publicly elected
officials-comptrollers, public advocates, and the like-whose
offices provide an oversight function. The body could receive
substantial structural support from private funding sources
concerned with the accountability and effectiveness of social
service contracts. The move to reliance on private entities to
participate in governance, discussed extensively above, 167 lends
credence to proposals for the government to augment their
capacity by using private groups to assist in the funding and
implementation of their oversight responsibilities.- 6 The
monitoring body could be a separately staffed organization or
an ongoing committee with organizational members, such as
the local workforce investment boards, mandated by the
Workforce Investment Act, where membership and function is
mandated by statute as a precondition to the operation of the
19
program.
A.

7

Specific EssentialElements10

To function successfully, monitoring bodies must have
four basic characteristics: (1) imposition of an altered notice
and comment structure in the procurement process; (2)
mandates to enable the monitoring body to design and
166

The subject area covered by the monitoring body could narrowly focus on

specific welfare programs or broadly focus on all human services contracts targeted at
poor communities.
167 See supra Part I.A.
168 Given the emphasis on good governance among current private funders,
efforts to fund these initiatives through a combination of public and private sources
may well be successful.
169 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
170 Before discussing the specific elements of the proposal, it is important to
note that there is variation across jurisdictions on questions of political and practical
feasibility. In jurisdictions where local government has a history of receptivity to
advocacy and where organizing and advocacy resources are plentiful, advocates may be
successful in implementing very robust forms of these proposals. In other jurisdictions,
more political and practical compromises might be necessary. For that reason, each
subsection in this Part describes why the element is essential, what the element is
designed to accomplish, and then both the element's ideal implementation form and
some political compromises that may still have the desired effect.
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implement an ongoing research agenda; (3) substantial
participation by program recipients in all aspects of the
monitoring bodies' work; and (4) a lack of conflict of interest
between the monitoring body and any potential bidders for
government services.
1. Imposition of an Altered Notice and Comment
Framework into Public Procurement Processes
To advance the values of government transparency and
public accountability, as well as to create structures that lend
additional political strength to traditionally subordinated
communities, procurement policies must be amended to invite
substantial input from both the public and the monitoring
body. This element is required because contract terms have
essentially taken the place of regulatory terms 7 ' and
contracting, in the welfare-to-work area, is a closed, nontransparent process with little if any means for affected
communities to participate in the process. 7 2 Thus, any
accountability structure must incorporate traditional public
law concepts of government transparency and opportunity for
public participation into the procurement process. The changes
needed include: the publication of proposed contract terms
concerning performance measures prior to their adoption, the
imposition of a mandatory comment period during which the
monitoring body, along with the general public, will have an
opportunity to evaluate the proposed performance measures
and issue recommendations, and a requirement that the
executive agency publish responses to comments received both
by the monitoring body and the general public. These
mechanisms would provide an opportunity for both members of
the community and the monitoring body to have access to
terms and to comment on them prior to their use in an
executed contract.
2. Mandates to Enable the Monitoring Body to Design
and Implement an Ongoing Research Agenda
Among the principles of new governance theory that are
particularly attractive in this context are the emphasis on
experimentation, evaluation, and the flexibility to redefine
171
172

See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
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programs in response to successes and failures. 173 As every good
social science researcher knows, however, the quality of any
evaluation always depends on the quality of the questions
asked and the ability of the researcher to get real answers. The
role of the proposed monitoring body is, in large part, to
provide ongoing evaluation of programs that is driven by the
self-articulated needs of program clients. In order to effectuate
this agenda, the body must be able to force government actors
and private entities to record and make publicly available data
on outcomes identified by the monitoring body, regardless of
whether those outcomes are included in the contract terms. In
addition, the monitoring body must have ongoing access to
program participants as well as government and private staff
174
involved in designing and implementing the program.
Like the element requiring substantial control by
program participants discussed in the next subsection, this
research-focused proposal represents a significant departure
from traditional administrative law concepts as well as from
generally broadened participatory governance concepts. Like
the element of community control, this element addresses the
problems of new governance structures when dealing with
traditionally subordinated populations and the need to
explicitly account for subordination in designing contracting
processes. A robust ability to force collection and publication of
data is essential in lending the political weight to a monitoring
body necessary to render substantive its participation in the
contracting process.

173
174

See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
Inclusion of these elements would result in research even more effective

than the research CVH was able to conduct. Although CVH managed to draw
significant conclusions from the available data, it was hampered by the lack of
collection of certain data points. For example, it depended heavily on its own survey for
important data points, such as knowledge about access to education and training and
disparities in outcome based on race, that would have been substantially more
convincing had the data come from the entire population. See THE REVOLVING DOOR,
supra note 8, app. A, at 19. Similarly, the A-DP depended entirely on its own sample
data and thus issued results based on a very small data set. FUTUREWORKS, supra note
148, § II. In addition, CVH's experience in a subsequent study lends credence to an
argument that more robust data access provisions are essential. In contrast to CVH's
experience in the research for The Revolving Door, in researching the WeCARE
program, CVH met substantially more resistance in providing data through the
Freedom of Information Law, which significantly impaired CVH's ability to draw
reliable conclusions. See supra note 71. Clearly, had these organizations been able to
force data collection on points of interest to them, they would have been able to monitor
more effectively and to be even more productive in making policy change
recommendations.
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3. Substantial Participation by Program Recipients in
All Aspects of the Monitoring Bodies' Work
As discussed extensively in Part III, welfare programs
have historically participated in the subordination of poor
communities. As argued in Part II, any ability that
communities and their advocates had to render these programs
accountable has been significantly eroded by privatization.
Although new governance structures are promising, they will
only be effective in creating programs that actually assist poor
communities if there is a mechanism in place to ensure that
community participation is meaningful. For all these reasons,
perhaps the most important attribute of any monitoring
structure is ensuring that the body includes substantial
participation
by
welfare
recipients
and
low-income
communities in all aspects of the body's work.
4. A Lack of Conflict of Interest Between the
Monitoring Body and Any Other Participants in the
Contracting Process
To adhere to transparency and public participation
principles, the composition or structure of the monitoring body
must function independently of both the executive branch
letting the contracts and any potential bidders for government
contracts. The exclusion of these two entities ensures a more
open conversation about these contracts, moving them from an
essentially closed, non-transparent negotiation between the
administrative agency and bidders into a process in which
175
affected participants can participate meaningfully.
The importance of creating a monitoring body that is
independent of both the agency and the contractors was
highlighted in a subsequent study by CVH. 176 After issuing The
Revolving Door, CVH began a study of the WeCare program, a
program designed to assess and assign individuals with
physical and mental impairments.1 77 The contract design for
that program, unlike that of the ESP program, included
mandatory monitoring by an outside entity, and the agency in
175

At this point, in the jurisdictions discussed above, contracting leaves no

room for participation by any other entities, much less impacted community members.
See supra Part II.
176

See generally FAILURE TO COMPLY, supra note 23.

177

Id. at 1.
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fact hired an outside entity to do this. 178 However, the entity in
question had numerous contracts with the agency, and CVH
concluded that the organization was not "entirely independent
of HRA and the reviews that [were] made available do not
17
provide adequate evaluations of WeCARE services." 9
Ideally, the monitoring body would be compromised of
organizations that are, with the exception of any funding
provided to serve on the monitoring body, fiscally independent
from government simply because this would provide the
maximum institutional independence. In larger jurisdictions
with a robust non-profit sector, such an exclusion may be
feasible. In others, where there are fewer potential
organizations available to play a role, compromises may have
to be made. 180 Still, to ensure independence, the better choice is
to exclude government-funded entities entirely and rely solely
on membership organizations and organizations focused on
research rather than include participation by organizations
whose ability to critically examine government programs would
be significantly compromised by funding concerns.
B.

Politicaland PracticalFeasibility

There is no question that there is a fundamental
contradiction at the heart of this proposal. The government's
historic and current role in the creation and implementation of
social welfare policy is so fundamentally intertwined with
Id. at 18.
Id. at 10.
180 Beyond the exclusion of the contractor and potential bidders, however, are
more difficult issues concerning, primarily, the role of non-profit entities that are not
potential bidders but that do rely on government funds for their operation. The nonprofit sector has historically played and to this day plays an enormously important role
both in the provision of social welfare services and in bringing attention to the needs of
low-income communities. Bezdek, supra note 165, at 1566. At the same time, as the
government turns more and more to the private sector to perform functions previously
performed by government agencies, the role of the non-profit sector in this work has
substantially increased and, in many circumstances changed. Id. at 1565-66; see
178

179

generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, HUNTER COLLEGE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, IN JEOPARDY:
THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON NONPROFIT HUMAN SERVICE AGENCIES IN NEW

YORK CITY (2002), available at http-//www.unitedwaynyc.orgpdf/injeopardy.pdf
(discussing the enormous adverse impact of welfare reform on the economic and social
security of clients and describing the impact of those changes on the the non profit
sector). As the government provides more and more of the funds supporting the nonprofit sector, the ability of these organizations to zealously advocate against
government policy is significantly compromised. Among the difficult questions a
jurisdiction would face in implementing these proposals is whether to exclude from
membership in the monitoring body entities that receive funding from the same branch
of government letting the contract but who do not intend to bid on the contract at issue.
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subordination that relying on government to create and
monitor contracts for provision of social services will inevitably
lead to a continuation of this history of subordination. In light
of this, there is a certain irony in advocating for the creation of
monitoring bodies by and with the government. It seems that if
this history is determinative, then in some sense the proposal
is doomed either to be entirely politically unfeasible to
implement or, if implemented, to be co-opted in a way that
fundamentally undermines its strength. My belief that this is,
perhaps, not entirely true comes from two observations. First,
in a very real sense, the technocratic efficiency justifications
that are the public face of privatization are also its Achilles'
heel. CVH's analysis of outcomes, when framed as a matter of
economic efficiency, bolsters less politically charged and highly
credible assertions that funds are being wasted and may
provide motivation for other branches of government or quasigovernmental bodies to step in to play some role in improving
outcomes. While that does not lead, per se, to community-led
monitoring, it does provide less overtly political means for
communities to advocate that additional oversight is needed to
improve results.
The second reason for hope is the presence, in at least
some communities, of community-based, membership-led
groups like CVH and the A-DP. The creation of a monitoring
body, even in a weaker form than proposed here, has the
potential to create a point of intervention and an additional site
through which these organizations can assert themselves and
engage in the politically contested questions of whose interests
social welfare programs should serve. And, in turn,
participation in such a body could raise the institutional
capacity of less strongly established community-based groups
that might lead to increased political power. The A-DP story
lends credence to that theory because the local Workforce
Investment Board, which, despite a facial requirement of
community participation, was originally not serving the needs
of the intended recipients of WIA services, did ultimately
provideU. a pinult Lf IntLeioL
fortheLUJL
L lu L'X-JJJ.
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their report, the A-DP was able to advocate for the
restructuring of the local workforce development system in a
way that made it more responsive to community needs. 8 2
181 See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the monitoring body could create points of
intervention through which community organizations could
intervene to affect welfare policy.
CONCLUSION

In closing, I want to say just a few words about limited
advocacy resources. Having spent the better part of a decade
working on welfare issues in New York City, I am all too aware
of the limited resources available to advocate on behalf of
welfare recipients and of the incredible importance of
continuing to enforce what few procedural, substantive,
constitutional, and statutory protections still apply. On the
other hand, given the scale of privatization and its broad
applicability to the wide range of programs traditionally run by
the government, I urge that existing efforts to confront
privatization 183 be expanded and that others in the welfare
advocacy community join forces with community-based
organizations to advocate for policies that respond directly to
privatization.

183

In the welfare area, in addition to the work of Community Voices Heard

and the Anti-Displacement Project highlighted in this Article, the National Center of
Law and Economic Justice works extensively on these issues. See National Center for
Law and Economic Justice, Privatization & Modernization, http://www.nclej.org/keyissues-privatization.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).

